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Recent decisions have raised the possibility that the National
Labor Relations Act may become a full-fledged equal employment
statute. It has long been recognized that a right exists to bring suit
against unions to enforce their duty of fair representation. The
obligation was initially read into the Railway Labor Act in Steele
v. Louisville & Nashville Railway1 and has been extended to the
National Labor Relations Act under the Steele rationale.2 Originally,
the right was enforceable only in the courts, but in the 1960's the
National Labor Relations Board began treating violations of the duty
of fair representation as unfair labor practices, remediable under the
Board's own special procedures. 3 Although judicial affirmance of
these decisions brought the Board power to deal with equal
employment violations by unions, it has had no power to similarly
deal with employers. This gap may have been filled by a novel theory
recently adopted by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit in United Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB.4 The court held
that the existence of discriminatory working conditions constitutes
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ARTICLE:
M. SOVRN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT (1970)

[hereinafter cited as SOVERN];
UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTs
ENFORC EMENT EFFORT, 1970 [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS EFFORT];

Developments in the Law-Employment Discriminationand Title VII bf the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,84 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Developments-Title VII].
1. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
2. Syres v. Oil Workers, 350 U.S. 892 (1955); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S.
330 (1953).
3. Local 12, URW [Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.], 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964), affd 368
F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966); Local 1367, ILA [Galveston Maritime Ass'n], 148 N.L.R.B. 897
(1964), affd 368 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1966); Metal Workers Local I [Hughes Tool Co.], 147
N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964); Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326
F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
4. 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969).
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an employer unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA
because it is an unlawful interference with the section 7 rights of
minority employees to engage in concerted activities to improve their
working conditions. Under this theory, the discrimination is said to
cause a cleavage between the interests of minority workers and others,
reducing the likelihood of their working in concert. It also creates
apathy or docility in its victims, inhibiting them from asserting their
section 7 rights. Though the Board has not yet adopted this view,
the General Counsel recently announced a position which is close to
the Packinghousetheory.5
Taken together, the Steele and Packinghouse decisions raise the
interesting possibility that almost every instance of racial, religious,
sex or ethnic discrimination in a company within the Board's
jurisdiction would be remediable through NLRB procedures. A
minority worker discriminated against by a labor union could file
an unfair labor practice charge on the theory that the union had
violated its duty of fair representation; the victim of employer
discrimination could file a charge, arguing that such discrimination
inhibits workers in the exercise of their section 7 rights. This result
might, in many respects, be a boon to civil rights efforts to improve
job opportunities for minorities. The present major federal instrument
for equal employment enforcement-Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act 6 -has been severely criticized because of its lack of
public enforcement provisions.7 The agency which administers Title
VII-the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission-has been
eviluated by the United States Civil Rights Commission as a "poor,
enfeebled thing . . . [which] is not much closer to the goal of the
elimination of employment discrimination than it was at its
inception." s Repeated efforts to amend Title VII to provide public
enforcement have thus far not been successful.9 In contrast, the
NLRA provides an existing means of public enforcement. An
individual who claims to be the victim of discrimination need only
5. In his quarterly report on significant pending cases, the General Counsel stated that when
an employer maintains sex discrimination practices in the face of union opposition, he violates
sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) by demonstrating the union's ineffectiveness and discouraging
employees from asserting their section 7 rights to bargain through their union, presumably
for the removal of these conditions. 77 BNA LAB. REL. REP. 36 (1971).
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1964). Title VII is discussed more fully at note 61
infra and accompanying text.
7. R. NATHAN, JOBS AND CIVIL RIGHTS 66 (1969); FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTs EFFORT 418.
See notes 73-87 infra and accompanying text.
8. FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS EFFORT418.

9. See, e.g., H.R. 10065, 89th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1965); S. 3465, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
An amendment is now before the House Rules Committee. H.R. 1746, 92d Cong., Ist
Sess.
(1971). See also note 96 infra.
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file a complaint with the NLRB's General Counsel. If probable cause
for such discrimination were found, the General Counsel's office
of prosecuting the charge before
would then assume the entire 1burden
0
either the Board or the courts

The Board's wholesale involvement in equal employment matters
would, however, raise troubling questions. The most important con-

cerns the language and structure of the NLRA. There is no evidence
that Congress expressly intended it to serve as an instrument for the
protection of equal job opportunities for minority groups. In fact, the

statute was primarily designed for a different purpose-to encourage
unionization and promote collective bargaining." Moreover, there is

at least some question about the Board's proceeding in this area in
disregard of the highly specific and carefully limited procedures
Congress has established under Title VII for employment discrimination problems. Inasmuch as the NLRB already has a heavy case
load in areas to which the statute seems expressly directed,' 2 one

questions the wisdom of an assumption of an additional burden
without strong reason. Finally, there is some question whether the

NLRB could proceed in this area without interfering with the work
of other equal employment agencies. Employers and unions are

already subject to heavy equal employment regulation, 3 and at times
the proliferation of agencies with dissimilar approaches in this field
has served to becloud effective law enforcement." In light of all
10. See National Labor Relations Act, § 3(d), 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1964).
11.Id. § 15 1.Section I of the Act sets forth its purpose by stating:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce. . . by encouraging the
practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers
of full freedom of association, self-organization and designation of representatives of
their own choosing ....
12. In 1970, the NLRB caseload included over 12,000 representation cases and 21,000 cases
involving unfair labor practices. This was an increase of 5,500 cases over the number five years
previously. See 77 BNA LAB. REL. RaP. 42-43 (1971), (Statement by former NLRB Chairman
Frank W. McCullough in appearance before Congressional Committee studying NLRB's
activities). McCullough referred to the NLRB's burden as an "increasing and crushing volume
of Board work. . . [with] resulting delays and frustrations."
13. In addition to Title VII, employers who work on government contracts or federallyassisted construction programs are subject to equal employment requirements under Exec.
Order No. 11,246,3 C.F.R. at 424 (1971), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. V, 1970). Many employers
are regulated by state fair employment practice commissions. See SovERN 19-60. Unions are
regulated in their apprenticeship programs by equal employment regulations of the Labor
Department's Bureau of Apprenticeship and Training. 29 C.F.R. §§ 30.1 -.16 (1971).
14. In Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), for example,
a series of problems arose because of inconsistent positions taken on the same case by various
equal employment agencies. Id. at 984-85. These problems are discussed in Farmer, Equal
Employment Opportunity-CaseStudy ofa ChaoticAdministration,44 FLA. B.J. 400 (1970).
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these factors, some commentators have strongly suggested that the
NLRB stand aside in areas otherwise covered by Title VII.15 The
Packinghouse decision, however, adopts exactly the opposite position, calling for an extension of the Board's responsibility in equal
employment enforcement, and illustrates the need for a re-examination of the Board's entire role in this area.
The Steele decision' s is the great grand-daddy of all subsequent
developments in the equal employment opportunity area. The
Railway Labor Act 7 made the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen
and Enginemen the exclusive bargaining representative of all firemen
employed by the railroad. The union, however, made an agreement
with the railroad that would eventually have led to the advancement
of whites and the exclusion of all blacks from the service. Despite
the lack of explicit language in the Railway Labor Act requiring fair
representation, the Supreme Court held that the union's conduct was
unlawful, arguing that the term "representative" in the fourth
paragraph of section 2 implied an obligation to act on behalf of all
the employees that the union was supposed to represent.' 8 It also
stated that the Act deprived minorities of a right they would otherwise
have had-to bargain individually with the employer.' 9 The Court
held that in granting such extensive power to unions, Congress had
impliedly imposed upon the unions a legislative-type obligation to
equally protect those they represented. 2 1 In the absence of any
available administrative remedy the Court found that the judiciary
had power to enjoin and grant damages for union discrimination. 2'
In subsequent cases, the Steele doctrine has been extended to
prohibit unfair union treatment of minorities who were not members
of the bargaining unit2 and to require that unions act affirmatively
to oppose employer discrimination.23 Inasmuch as the policies behind
Steele are equally applicable to unions operating under the National
Labor Relations Act, the Court eventually applied Steele to judicial
enforcement of fair representation under the latter statute. It must
15. Sherman, Union's Duty of FairRepresentation and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 49
MINN. L. REV. 771 (1965). It has also been argued that the NLRB should defer to the EEOC

if the latter agency acquires enforcement powers by amendment of Title VII. See Note,
Allocating Jurisdiction Over Racial Issues Between the EEOC and NLRB: A Proposal,54

CORNELL L. REv. 943 (1969).
16. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
17. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1964).
18. 323 U.S. at 199.
19. Id. at 200.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

at 202.
Id. at 207.
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952).
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
See cases cited at note 2 supra.
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be noted, however, that there is a major difference between the two

acts in the unique role played by the NLRB under the NLRA. Most
rights and liabilities under that statute are enforced through the Board
rather than directly in court.
While at the time of Steele the Board had no authority to remedy
union discrimination, since the Act contained only employer unfair

labor practices, the addition of union unfair labor practices in the
Taft-Hartley amendmentss gave the Board potential power in this
area. Perhaps because Congress had not explicitly created a right of
fair representation in Taft-Hartley, that authority was not utilized
until 196226 when the Board held in Miranda Fuel Co.2Y that a union
which caused an employer to arbitrarily reduce the seniority of a
worker had committed an unfair labor practice by violating its duty
of fair representation. Though this decision was reversed by the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 2 the Board continued to adhere
to its Miranda view in cases which followed. In Independent Metal
Workers, Local I [Hughes Tool Co.],? for example, the doctrine was

applied to union racial discrimination, and the Board's judgment on
this question was affirmed in a subsequent case by the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals." ° Since the doctrine has application to any union
25. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)

(1964).
26. The evolution in the Board's and General Counsel's thinking on this issue is well
summarized in Herring, The "Fair Representation" Doctrine: An Effective Weapon Against
Union Racial Discrimination?,24 My.L. Rav. 113, 148-58 (1964). In the early 1950's, the
General counsel took the position that the denial of fair representation was not an unfair labor
practice. This view was specifically stated in an amicus curiae brief filed in Ford Motor Co.
v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953), and in 1954 the General Counsel affirmed a regional
director's refusal to issue an 8(b)(1) complaint in a case where a union failed to protest a
company rule which discriminated against Negroes. Case No. 1047, 35 L.R.R.M. 1130 (1954).
However, in 1956 there was an indication of a shift in the General Counsel's position-he
refused to issue a complaint against a union in a case involving racial discrimination solely
because he found no evidence that the union had instigated the discrimination. Case No. K311, 37 L.R.R.M. 1457 (1956). In 1958, the Board accepted without comment a decision by
one of its trial examiners based on his opinion that a union violated 8(b)(l)(A) when it defaulted
on its duty of fair representation, though the case could have been disposed of on other grounds.
Local 229, UTW [J.Radley Metzger Co.], 120 N.L.R.B. 1700 (1958). Finally, in \liranda
Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962) the Board held explicitly that a violation of the duty of
fair representation is an unfair labor practice.
27. 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962).
28. NLRBv. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
29. 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964).
30. Local 12, URW v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837
(1967). The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has also upheld the Board's Miranda theory in a
non-racial case. Truck Drivers Local 568 v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
Thus far, however, the Supreme Court has chosen not to rule on the theory. It denied
certiorari in two cases where it had an opportunity to make such a ruling. Local 12, UR.W
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action on the basis of "unfair, irrelevant or invidious factors," 3t it
has widespread potential for attacking union discrimination against
any minority group worker, as well as for attacking union failure
32
to actively oppose employer discrimination.
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MINORITIES AS A UNION UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICE

ConstitutionalBasisfor the Doctrine

Though there may have been some doubt on the question in 1944,
it is now perfectly clear that the Steele decision is based on a policy
of constitutional necessity.? The federal and state governments have
a constitutional obligation to refrain from arbitrary action against
minority group members under the fifth and fourteenth 5
v. NLRB supra and Local 1367, ILA [Galveston Maritime Ass'n], 148 N.L.R.B. 897 (1964),
aff'd 368 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1966). Certiorari was denied in both cases. 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
The Court also failed to take an explicit position on this issue in Republic Steel Corp. v.
Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965) and Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 344 (1964).
31. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 185 (1962).
32. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). There are several aspects of the Board's
involvement in this general area which are not within the scope of this article. First, as indicated
in 4firanda, the Board's theory regarding the duty of fair representation as an unfair labor
practice extends beyond minority employees to the protection of any employees treated by their
union in "an unfair, irrelevant or invidious" manner. Second, the Board in the 1960's did
more with regard to discriminating unions than to hold them guilty of unfair labor practices.
It also refused to apply its normal contract bar rule to protect a union which discriminated,
Pioneer Bus Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 594 (1962), and rescinded its certification of a union which
discriminated, Metal Workers Local 1 [Hughes Tool Co.], 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964). These
sanctions constitute a withdrawal by the Board, in the case of discriminating unions, of
protections which would otherwise normally be granted. For an analysis of the Board's role
in these areas, see SovERN 156-60.
One might argue that the Board would satisfy any responsibilities it has in this area by
simply denying its protections to unions which discriminate. However, many unions, such as
the skilled building trade unions, bastions of discrimination, are now so powerful that a loss
of Board certification would have no effect on their power. Against other unions, decertification
is a heavy, inflexible weapon. It may be entirely inappropriate in cases where unions committing
isolated acts of discrimination would be fatally weakened by decertification. The unfair labor
practice provisions allow for more flexible, specific remedies.
33. Note that Justice Murphy's concurring opinion suggested this possibility in Steele, 323
U.S. at 208.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. V. In Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), the Supreme Court
held that "discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process." Id. at
499. In that case, and in Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948), the companion case to Shelley
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), the Court held that the federal government was proscribed
from either subsidizing (Boiling) or judicially approving (Hurd) racial discrimination. Though
the question has not been explicitly resolved by the Supreme Court, it clearly appears that
the federal government is restricted from engaging in discrimination against minorities to the
same extent as the states. It would be "unthinkable" for the federal government to have a
lesser obligation. See NV. LOCKHART, Y. KANIISAR, J. CnOPaR, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1207
(4th ed. 1970).
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amendments, respectively. In the last quarter-century the Supreme
Court has taken major strides in extending this obligation, through
the state action concept, 3 to quasi-private associations like labor
unions which function with considerable governmental support and
delegated public authority. In Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority,3 the Court held that a restaurant which leased its facilities
from a state parking authority had violated the equal protection rights
of blacks by refusing to serve them. The Court said that by leasing
its property to the restaurant, the state had "so far insinuated itself
into a position of interdependence" with the restaurant "that it
[became] a joint participant in the challenged activity which, on that
account," was subject to fourteenth amendment restrictions.3 The
Court noted that the parking authority could have forbidden the
lessee's discriminating and that "by its inaction . . .[it] elected to
place its power, property and prestige behind the admitted
discrimination." 3 9
Without a requirement of fair representation, the federal
government would almost assuredly be more implicated in labor
union discrimination than the state was in Burton. Through the
NLRA, the federal government assists labor unions in their
organizational efforts and forces employers to bargain with the
unions after they are elected by a majority of the employees; it
protects those who are involved in union activity from punitive action
by employers; and most importantly, it is the very source of the power
which the unions use to discriminate since the Act gives the union
exclusive authority to represent minority employees. Without the Act,
The cases referred to in the text are primarily race discrimination cases. However, it is
clear that equal protection obligations apply to the same extent to discrimination against ethnic
or religious minorities. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). It is also clear
that the equal protection clause protects women from governmentally supported sex
discrimination. Although the Supreme Court has in the past used a very permissive standard of
review for sex classifications, see Comment, Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection: Do
We Need A Constitutional Amendment?, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1499 (1971), it recently found
such a classification to be in violation of the equal protection clause, Reed v. Reed, 40
U.S.L.WV. 4013 (U.S. Nov. 23, 1971). Thus, the government has a constitutional responsibility
to see that labor unions do not discriminate against women.
35. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
36. See generally Van Alystyne, Mr. Justice Black, Constitutional Review, and the
Talisman of StateAction, 1965 DuKe L.J. 219.
37. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
38. Id. at725.
39. Id.
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these employees would be free to make their own bargain,"0 and by
not requiring fair representation, the federal government "would be
placing its power, property and prestige behind the discrimination."
In Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak," first and fifth amendment
standards were held applicable to a privately owned public utility
transit company largely on the basis that it was regulated and licensed
by the federal government. Labor unions are heavily regulated not
only by the NLRA but also by other comprehensive federal
legislation. 2 They hold, therefore, something very much like a federal
"license" to operate in representation of employees through the form
of Board certification of their status as bargaining agents.4"
A second line of authority provides support for the conclusion
that labor unions have a constitutional obligation to provide fair
treatment to minority workers. Under these cases, private
associations which take on governmental-type responsibilities by
delegation from the state are subject to constitutional regulation in
their use of those powers." It could be argued that most of these cases
apply constitutional standards to activities that are more "typically"
governmental than a labor union's representation of workers in
40. Steele v. Louisville &Nashville Ry., 323 U.S. 192, 200 (1944).
41. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
42. E.g., Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (Landrum-Griffin Act)
§§ 101-231,29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1964).
43. The Court has already held constitutional standards applicable to a labor union in IAM
v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961). In that case, a union was held to have violated the first and
fifth amendment rights of a political dissenter by using his dues, obtained under a union shop
agreement, for political purposes with which he disagreed. The requisite state action was found
from a section of the Railway Labor Act which permitted the union shop and nullified any
state right to work law to the contrary. A broader rationale has, however, been suggested for
the Street decision:
The case for governmental action might have been made more persuasively if more
broadly [in Street]. Consider that the union shop provision of the Railway Labor Act
is but one section of a comprehensive regulatory statute, a statute establishing a federal
program for the railroads designed to encourage collective bargaining. Thus, the statute's
union shop provision . . . embodies a federal policy which encourages the formation
of union security provisions. The statute says to the unions, go ahead and do what your
philosophy tells you to do. This encouragement might be thought to provide sufficient
government involvement to make the first and fifth amendments applicable. Indeed,
perhaps the extent to which federal statutes have given unions control over the economic
well-being of the bulk of employees in an enterprise may be considered a delegation to
the union of governmental power . . . . H. VELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL
PaocEss 244 (1968).
44. "[W]hen private individuals or groups are endowed by the state with powers or functions
governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumentalities of the State and subject to
its constitutional limitations." Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966).
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collective bargaining with the employer 45-the operation of a
company town,4" the selection by political parties of candidates for
election as public officials, 47 and the operation of a long-time
municipal park by a private organization.4 However, it may be
sufficient that the activities performed by the private group closely
resemble governmental functions. Thus, in Local590 v. Logan Vallfy
Plaza, Inc.,49 first amendment standards were held applicable to a
private shopping center, largely because it resembled the company
town situation in Marsh v. Alabama.5° Under this view, the Marsh
line may well have applicability to labor unions. Their collective
bargaining activities have been described by the Supreme Court as
a system of "industrial self-government," 51 and the agreements they
adopt have been treated like legislative enactments or the creation
of a "new common law."5 The power to engage in these activities
is largely delegated to labor unions by the government through their
"exclusive representative" powers under the NLRA. 3 Thus, labor
unions using their delegated power to engage in quasi-governmental
functions are also subject to governmental responsibilities not to
discriminate against the minority groups they represent.
Finally, Shelley v. Kraemer4 and its companion case, Hurd v.
Hodge, 5" proscribe the judiciary from enforcing private
discriminatory agreements. As a result of the passage of section 301
of the Taft-Hartley Act 6 making labor agreements enforceable in the
federal courts, both federal and state courts are now heavily involved
45. See Symposium-Individual Rights in IndustrialSelf-Government, 63 Nw. U.L. REv.

4, 25 (1968), which provides a comprehensive discussion of the applicability of this line of cases
to the general industrial relations system.
46. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
47. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
48. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
49. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
50. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
51. United Steelworkers v. Warrior and Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580 (1960). The
Court has described the collective agreement as "a generalized code to govern a myriad of
cases which draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate . . . [calling] into being a new common
law-the common law of a particular industry or of a particular plant.' Id. at 578-79.
52. Id. at 580.
53. One could even argue that the federal government has delegated to the collective
bargaining process some of its authority to legislate on wages, hours, and employment
conditions for the national welfare. Symposium, supra note 44, at 25,26.
54. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).

55. 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
56. Labor-Management Relations Xct (Taft-Hartley) § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964).
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in enforcing collective bargaining contracts. 7 The policies of Shelley
and Hurd strongly support the creation of a duty of fair
representation as a means of helping assure that courts do not enforce
agreements that are discriminatorily negotiated or administered. The
duty of fair representation performs this function by acting as a check
on union behavior at each stage of the negotiation and administration
process to see that minority rights are not violated.

It is important to understand the limits of this argument. The
position set forth above is not based on the theory that all labor union

activities are subject to constitutional regulation. In matters of
internal union affairs, there are strong public policies which favor
free private association and which may argue against subjecting union
decisions to judicial review under constitutional standards." However,
when labor unions use their express statutory power to affect the
employment status of minorities, the government and the courts have
a clear constitutional obligation to assure that such workers receive
fair treatment.59
Union Discrimination-TheNLRB and OtherSources ofRelief
The NLRB and the Judiciary. One can argue that even if the
duty of fair representation of minority employees is constitutionally
necessary, the government satisfies its responsibilities by the existence
of a judicial remedy for unfair representation, which was recognized
57. Such agreements were enforceable to some extent in state courts even before the passage
of this section. However, many state courts would not assert jurisdiction over unions on the
theory that they are not "suable entities." This section was designed to create a federal forum
for the enforcement of such agreements. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-18 (1947).
In Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) the section was interpreted as a
grant of authority to the judiciary to fashion a new substantive law of collective bargaining
agreement enforcement, which is also applicable to the state courts under the Supremacy Clause.
See also Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, Local 770,398 U.S. 235 (1970).
58. See H. WELLINGTON, supra note 43, at 245 (1968). See also Oliphant v. Firemen &
Enginemen, 156 F. Supp. 89 (N.D. Ohio), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 893 (1957), aff'd 262 F.2d
359 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 935 (1959). Contra Betts v. Easley, 161 Kan. 459,
169 P.2d 831 (1946). See generally Gould, Some Limitations Upon Union Discipline Under
the NationalLaborRelationsAct: The RadiationsofAilis-Chalmers, 1970 DUKE L.J. 1067.
59. The government's constitutional responsibility extends beyond unions presently certified
by the Board. It clearly extends to those once certified who no longer hold a Board certification
since the government was heavily involved in their initial achievement of power. Moreover, it
should probably extend to unions which have achieved management recognition since 1935,
even though they have never had formal Board certification. The labor movement is closely
interrelated. It is clear that the existence of the Act and the Board's activities on behalf of
some unions have "encouraged and supported" the achievements of all other successful unions
and that all union activity should come within the meaning of Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
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in Vaca v. Sipes."0 In light of the Vaca decision that the judicary will
continue to exercise its historical role in this area despite recent Board
decisions, it might be argued that the Board can in good conscience
withdraw from the field and allow the courts to enforce the rights
of minority workers. Policy considerations, however, clearly indicate
a vital need for the Board's continued presence.
The right to fair representation, having been read into the NLRA
by the Court," is as much a part of the statute as any other provision.
It would be anomalous to require a victim of sex or race
discrimination by a labor union to go to court to enforce his rights
while the agency with primary responsibility for the administration
of the Act looked the other way. Moreover, a union and employer
can obtain free enforcement of their rights through the Board's
General Counsel; if the Board were permitted to abandon the field,
these rights would have a higher priority than the employees' rights
to fair treatment from their unions. This would be especially unfair
because the employee will normally be least likely to have the
resources necessary for private judicial suit. The paucity of cases in
twenty-five years of experience with the judicial doctrine of fair
representation62 indicates that the expense of going to court has been
a major deterrent to private suit,3 and that judicial enforcement is
an inadequate solution to employee discrimination problems. From
an administrative viewpoint, the Board is almost surely more effective
in dealing with problems in this area than the judiciary. Those in the
General Counsel's office will generally have a broader background
and more expertise in prosecuting labor relations cases than less
specialized private attorneys. On the hearing side, Board members
60. 386 U.S. 171 (1967). This case resolved the question whether violations of the union's
duty of fair representation are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. Specifically, the
question was whether the broad pre-emption doctrine of San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959)-which held that activities arguably protected or prohibited by
the NLRA are within the Board's exclusive jurisdiction-applied to this situation. The Court
held that it did not apply to fair representation cases, largely on the basis of the judiciary's
earlier entry into that field.
61. See note 2 supraand accompanying text.
62. See notes 25-28 supra and accompanying text.
63. The ample powers of the judiciary notwithstanding, Negro resistance to union
discrimination has rarely included reliance on the unequivocal holdings in Steele and the
decisions following it. Any of the busy state FEPC's receive far more employment complaints
from Negroes in one year than all of the courts have received in Steele in over 20 years. In
part, this may be attributed to the expense of obtaining counsel familar with the intricacies
of our federal labor legislation and of pursuing the matter through the courts. In other words,
the high cost of suing has probably robbed the right to be fairly represented of much of its
efficacy. SOVERN 155.
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and trial examiners are likely to bring a lifetime of labor relations
experience to their jobs, and can be expected to be particularly
perceptive regarding union discriminatory practices whereas, it would
be rare to find a lower court judge with the benefit of comparable
experience. Finally, the Board-hearing all cases itself-has the
capacity to develop uniform policies in this area.14 This argument
cannot be claimed for the judicial doctrine which would leave
enforceability to all federal and state courts.
The NLRB and Title VII. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
19 6461 gives comprehensive substantive rights to victims of labor
union discrimination. It makes it unlawful for a union to discriminate
in its membership policies, to limit or deprive anyone of an
employment opportunity because of his race, color, religion, sex or
national origin, or to cause an employer to discriminate against any
individual for such reason."8 Almost any union discrimination against
minority groups that might be prohibited by the NLRA is therefore
dealt with explicitly under Title VII. For this reason, some
commentators have suggested that the NLRB refrain from using its
unfair labor practice powers in such cases and defer to the Civil
67
Rights statute.
It is important to note at the outset that Title VII does not as a
matter of law preclude the use of other equal employment remedies.
There is nothing in the statute which makes it an exclusive remedy
for employment discrimination. The Justice Department has taken
the position that Title VII was designed independently of the NLRA
68
and was not intended to limit the role of the NLRB in this area.
64. See Wellington, Union Democracy and FairRepresentation, 67 YALE L.J. 1327, 1357-

61 (1958), in which the author discusses the difficulty that courts have had in formulating
appropriate standards in this area and suggests, four years in advance of the Miranda Fuel
Co. case that the NLRB may be uniquely capable ofdoing the job.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-15 (1964).
66. Id. § 2000e-2(c).
67. See note 15 supra.
68. Nothing in Title VII or anywhere else in this bill affects rights and obligations under
the NLRA and the Railway Labor Act. Of course, Title VII is not intended to and
does not deny to any individual, rights and remedies which he may pursue under other
Federal and State statutes. If a given action should violate both Title VII and the
National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board would not be
deprived of jurisdiction. To what extent racial discrimination is covered by the NLRA
is not entirely clear. I understand that the National Labor Relations Board has presently
under consideration a case involving the duties of a labor organization with respect to
discrimination because of race. At any rate, Title VII would have no effect on the duties
of an employer or labor organization under the NLRA or under the Railway Labor
Act and these duties would continue to be enforced as they are now. . . . 110 CoNG.
Rac. 7206-07 (1964) (letter from the Justice Department to Senator Clark).
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The Senate, moreover, resoundingly defeated an amendment which
would have made Title VII the exclusive remedy for employment
discrimination.69 This position has been substantiated by the courts
who have thus far dealt with the question by concluding that Title
70
VII does not preempt the NLRB.
The question, therefore, is one of policy and any answer must
take into account Title VII's record of severe weakness in enforcing
equal job opportunity. As mentioned previously, the United States
Civil Rights Commission takes a very dim view of the effectiveness
of the thief administering agency of the Title-the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. 71 The EEOC's own studies
have demonstrated Title VIi's failures in dealing with one of the most
significant and prominent areas of labor union discrimination-union
72
blockage of jobs for minorities in the skilled building trades.
The major problem with the Civil Rights Act as now written is
that it simply does not provide for adequate public enforcement. The
EEOC is designed to perform a persuading, mediating and
conciliating role.73 Unfortunately, as the number of its cases has
grown, the Commission has had a declining record of success in
conciliation efforts. In 1969, for example, it failed to achieve even
partial success in remedying discrimination by agreement in more
than 50% of its cases.74 This lack of success may be attributable to
the inability of the Commission to bring meaningful pressure against
individuals charged with discrimination, thereby providing them with
little incentive to settle voluntarily.7 5 This puts the individual
complainant in an anomalous position. If he wishes to go to court
69. The amendment read as follows:
[Title VII] shall constitute the exclusive means whereby any department, agency or
instrumentality in the executive branch of the Government or any independent agency
of the United States, may grant or seek relief from or pursue any remedy with respect
to, any employment agency, labor organization or joint labor-management committee
covered by this title, if such employment practice may be the subject of a charge or
complaint filed under this title. 110 CONG. REc. 13650 (1964).
70. United Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126, 1133-34 n.l I (D.C. Cir. 1969);
Local 12, UR.W v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12,24 (5th Cir. 1966).
71. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
72. See Leiken, PreferentialTreatment in the Skilled Building Trades: An Analysis of the
PhiladelphiaPlan, 56 CORNtLL L. REV. 84,86 n.14 (1970).
73. Developments-Title VII 1196-98.
74. FEDERAL CIVIL Riuirs ErFORT 327. A successful conciliation effort is one which results
in an agreement by the charged party, the EEOC and the charging party. In a partially
successful agreement, the charged party agrees to discontinue the discrimination but refuses
to sign an agreement. FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTs EFFORT 327 n.75.
75. Developments-Title VII 1201.
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to enforce his rights, he can normally do so sixty days after the filing
of his charge. 71 If he takes this approach, however, he is allowing
insufficient time for the conciliation process to operate and he loses
the benefit of the mediation approach entirely. 77 If he waits for
conciliation, he can expect a delay of almost two years, 78 at which
time he may be in no better position than when he started.
Title VII's main potential comes from its individual court suit
provisions, but there are substantial deterrents to the exercise of this
power. Victims of discrimination are likely to be fearful of the severe
expense of protracted litigation. Though the Act does contain
provisions for judicial appointment of attorneys for plaintiffs, this
is a matter entirely within the judge's discretion and no funds are
provided to pay the attorneys' fees.79 The attorney is therefore
dependent for payment upon victory and a percentage of his client's
recovery. In addition, the Act provides that losing litigants may be
required to pay the expenses of their prevailing opponents, 0 and thus
suffer a severe penalty for having brought suit. There is, moreover,
no experienced bar to take on litigation in this areaA' In light of these
factors it is not surprising that the great majority of private claimants
have been discouraged from filing actions. EEOC Chairman William
H. Brown IIr has, in fact, indicated the scope of this problem by noting that private suits are now brought in fewer than ten per cent of
the cases in which the EEOC is unable to obtain private settlement. 2
The Attorney General does have power in "pattern and practice"
cases to bring suit for violations of Title VII. This statutory power,
however, applies only to limited classes of cases where instances of
discrimination are unusually severe in a particular industry or area.
It is enforced by the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department
which is already understaffed and whose resources are principally
diverted to other areas-such as discrimination in housing and
schools.84 The power to date has been used sparingly, and where it
76. Id. at 1207 n.71.
77. Id. at 1201-02.
78. Hearings on S. 2453 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor

and Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1964).
80. Id. § 2000e-5(k).
81. FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS EFFoRT 338.

82. Hearingson S. 2453, supra note 78, at 40.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1964).
84. FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS EFFORT 372.

85. From the effective date of Title VIi through early 1971, 6nly 57 pattern or practice
suits had been brought by the Department of Justice. Developments-Title VII 1109, 1230
n.206.
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has been invoked it has been to' establish precedent rather than to
enforce the statute. 8s For all of these reasons, the vast majority of
Title VII violations continue uncorrected.8 7
By contrast, the NLRA is designed to be implemented by public,
rather than private, enforcement through the office of the General
Counsel. In this respect, it plays a unique role in the whole federal
civil rights scheme." Though Board conciliation may also require a
long time, an individual is at least guaranteed public enforcement
at the end of the line if conciliation is unsuccessful. The General
Counsel also has power to seek immediate temporary relief under
section l0(j).81 Thus far, the Board appears to have been more
successful than the EEOC in disposing of cases through the
conciliation process." Though the Board has no "cease and desist"
powers of its own, it does have authority to sue in federal court to
enforce its decisions. Because of this power and the considerable
deference reviewing courts pay to Board decisions, 91 there is a very
great likelihood that those charged with discrimination will yield to
Board pressure in the conciliation process.
Obviously, the Board's assertion of a role in this area raises
some problems of overlap with Title VII. There is a definite need for
greater coordination of the efforts of the various agencies working
on civil rights in employment.92 In light of its potential in this area, it
is unfortunate that a representative from the Board was not included
86. Id. at 1231-32.
87. Id. at 1252.
88. The other major federal statute which has been interpreted to provide a remedy for
job discrimination, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1964), also relies on private suits for enforcement. See
Central Contractors Ass'n v. Local 46, IBEWV, 312 F. Supp. 1388 (W.D. Wash. 1969). Exec.
Order No. 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (1965), as amended, Exec. Order 11375, 32 Fed. Reg.
14303 (1967), is designed to eliminate job discrimination on federal contracts and on federally
assisted construction projects. However, it is inadequate as a vehicle for combatting union
discrimination since it specifically regulates only employer practices and contains no meaningful
provisions with regard to unions. See Leiken, supra note 72, at 95. The Labor Department
has regulations requiring non-discrimination in registered union apprenticeship programs. 29
C.F.R. § 30.1 -.16 (1970). However, this program is ineffective since the penalty for violation
of the regulations-deregistration-takes away no meaningful benefits and is little more than
a slap on the wrist. Leiken, supra note 72, at 97. The inadequacies of most state civil rights
agencies in the job discrimination area are very well described in SOVERN 19-60.
89. National Labor Relations Act § 100), 29 U.S.C. § 1600) (1964).
90. The NLRB in an average year settles through voluntary withdrawal of the charge,
settlement agreement, or dismissal, approximately 90% of the charges it receives. See A. Cox
& D. BOK, LABOR LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 138 (7th ed. 1969).
91. NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 369 U.S. 404, 405 (1962); Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,488 (1951); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 130-31 (1944).
See also Developments--Tile VII 1201.
92. See FEDERAL CIVIL RiGtrrs EFFORT 422.
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on the Interagency Coordinating Board which has recently been
formed.93 However, the Board could eliminate most of the risks of
duplicative procedures by paying proper deference on its own to Title
VII. In this regard, the existing procedures for accommodation of
arbitration proceedings provide a helpful analogy. In Spielberg
ManufacturingCo.,94 the Board held that an arbitrator's decision in
a case which involved an arguably unfair labor practice would be
respected as long as "the proceedings appear to have been fair and
regular, all parties had agreed to be bound, and the decision of the
arbitration panel is not clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies
of the Act." 95 If an issue of union discrimination has been fully
adjudicated in a Title VII judicial proceeding, the General Counsel
should decline to exercise jurisdiction over a complaint based on the
same charge. Because of the issue's resolution in a federal court, the
Board could safely assume that fair procedures were followed and
that its independent interest in the litigation of union discrimination
questions has been satisfied. If the earlier case was tried by the Justice
Department, it is even arguable that collateral estoppel would prevent
the Board from relitigating the issues resolved.9" The same policy
should be followed when a complaint has been settled under EEOC

guidance, to ensure that the Board does not undermine EEOC
settlement efforts.
93. The Interagency Staff Coordinating Committee now in operation was formed in July,
1969 and includes representatives of the Justice Department, Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission and Labor Department. Id. at 404.
94. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
95. Id.at 1082.
96. The question of collateral estoppel in regard to administrative determinations is a highly
sophisticated one, complex enough to justify treatment in a separate article. See Project, Federal
Administrative Law Developments-1969, 1970 DuKE L.J. 67, 133-46; Note, Res Judicataand
Administrative Jurisdiction-A Proposalfor Resolving Conflicts Between Agencies With
OverlappingJurisdiction, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1056 (1967); Note, The Applicability of
Res Judicataand CollateralEstoppel to Actions Brought Under Section 8(b)(4) of the National
Labor Relations Act, 67 MICH. L. REv. 824 (1969). The Supreme Court, however, has recently
made it clear that collateral estoppel does apply to administrative determinations where
appropriate. United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966). Professor
Davis has argued that res judicata and collateral estoppel have applicability in the
administrative law context, but that the normal rules may require serious qualification in this
area because of the different roles played by courts and administrative agencies. K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIvE LAW TREATISE § 18.03 (1958). It is questionable whether collateral estoppel
will be given much impact in regard to cases under the NLRA and Title VII which are first
brought under one statute and then filed under the other. See Tipler v. E.I. duPont deNemours
& Co., 443 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1971). The legislative history and language of the two statutes
are sufficiently different to make it probable that a majority of courts would not treat the
resolution of most issues under one as collateral estoppel under the ther. See K. DAVIS, supra
§ 18.04. In the typical situation, moreover, there would be different parties in the two cases

Vol. 1971:8331

NLRB ROLE

Where arbitration is imminent in a case, the Board generally
declines to assert jurisdiction until the proceeding has been completed
and the decision can bp reviewed under its Spielberg standards. 9'
Similarly, it ought to defer action on a case alleging minority
discrimination when a charge has previously been filed before the
EEOC. In such a situation, the EEOC's own investigators would be
working on the case, state civil rights officers may also be involved,9"
and there is no reason why the union charged with discrimination
should have to deal with a small mob of investigating authorities.
Although some burden should probably be placed on the individual
to select his own remedy, one who becomes dissatisfied with EEOC
procedures and chooses to withdraw his charge should be able to get
action from the NLRB. Either alternative would offer some
advantages. Most cases would undoubtedly continue to be filed under
Title VI I since law and precedent are much better established under
that statute. The NLRB procedures, however, ought to be available
as an alternative option to the litigant who cannot afford private
enforcement or who simply desires public adjudication of his rights.9
It is appalling that actions under Title VI I now terminate in ninety
percent of the cases in which EEOC is unable to obtain private
settlement.1 01 Hopefully, as the NLRB's role becomes better
established, individuals will seek public enforcement of their rights
from the Board in such situations rather than abandofi their
since thie prosecuting party under the NLRA would be the General Counsel whereas the plaintiff
under Title VII would be a private individual. However, federal officers are treated for collateral
estoppel purposes as being in privity with each other. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins,
310 U.S. 381 (1940). Therefore, if the Title VII case were tried by the Justice Department
and the NLRA case by the General Counsel in a situation where the factual issue was precisely
the same-for instance, whether a union engaged in racial discrimination-it is arguable that
collateral estoppel would apply.
97. Dubo Mfg. Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 431 (1963); Ordman, The Arbitratorand the NLRB,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 20TH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 47, 56

(1967). See also Wollett, The Agreement and the National Labor Relations Act: Courts,
Arbitratorsand the NLRB-Who Decides What?, 14 LAB. L.J. 1041, 1043 (1963).
98. In any state which has a law prohibiting job discrimination, the EEOC is required to
turn the complaint over to state authorities for 60 days. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1964).
Generally, state and EEOC investigations go on concurrently after that time.
Developments-Title VII 1109, 1215.
99. In order to comply with the statute of limitations under the NLRA, this would
necessitate filing of charges with both agencies within six months of the incident which was
the basis for the complaint. In this situation, however, the NLRB could delay action on the
charge until the EEOC had exhausted its efforts. After the individual had waived his right to
sue in court under Title VII, the General Counsel could proceed with action on the charge.
100. See note 82supraand accompanying text.

.850
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grievances entirely.'10 In light of Title VI I's severe defects, to deprive
the Board of its power in this area would be a serious mistake.
Moreover, it would leave the Board in an undesirable, anomalous
posture--enforcing the rights of white males to fair treatment from
their unions while rejecting complaints by blacks, females and other
minority workers. 0 2
Statutory Analysis of NLRA -Potential For Unfair Labor Practice

FindingsAgainst Discriminatory Unions
The policy favoring a Board role in this area is the same as the
policy behind the Steele decision-the constitutional necessity that
the government, as the source of union power over minority workers,
provide protections against the abuse of that power.' The Court,
noting the absence of any possible administrative remedy in Steele,
offered the judiciary as a forum to give at least minimal protection
to employee rights. Because of the possibility of an administrative
remedy after the passage of Taft-Hartley, the Board has begun to
play a role in this area in order to give effective implementation to
those rights. One could argue against this position on the basis that
101. The scheme proposed here is intended as a possible suggestion for achieving an
accommodation between the two statutes. it certainly could require change and refinement.
However, given the realities of Title Vii's failures in this area, it is a far more desirable solution
than the NLRB's total abandonment of its unfair labor practice role in minority discrimination
cases, a suggestion made elsewhere. See note 15 supraand accompanying text. A similar method
of NLRB accommodation could be achieved in relation to other means of attacking
employment discrimination-judicial suit based on the theory of fair representation or suit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1964).
102. A bill is once again before Congress to grant the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission enforcement powers. H.R. 1746, 92d Cong., IstSess. (1971); see H.R. REP. No.
238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). For prior efforts to obtain these powers, see note 9 supra
and accompanying text. The bill, however, is opposed by the Administration. 76 BNA LAD.
REL REP. 184 (1971). Even if this bill passes, the NLRB should continue to play a role in
this area. In its new version, the EEOC would have enormous responsibilities-taking over
the enforcement of equal employment rights on all government contract work from the Office
of Federal Contract Compliance in addition to its present overwhelming work load. Most of
this work would involve discrimination by employers. In such asituation it would still be highly
desirable to have another federal agency available to deal with discrimination by labor unions.
Moreover, the EEOC is always subject to very significant political pressures and is vulnerable
because it operates in a heated arena. It is directly tied to Congress' purse strings and is subject
to considerable political immobilization. Given such dangers, it is highly desirable that there
be an alternative forum to which victims of discrimination may turn for an adjudication of
their rights. This is not the type of area which necessarily requires one comprehensive,
sophisticated and uniform system of regulation such as the regulation of communication by
-the Federal Communications Commission. Rather, the major need is to remedy individual
instances of discrimination, and there is no reason why this should not be accomplished by
different agencies with diverse approaches.
103. See notes 16-32supra and accompanying text.
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Congress failed to explicitly make such union discrimination an
unfair labor practice. 104 Despite this lack of express language,
however, a persuasive argument can be made that two of the TaftHartley provisions empower the Board to reach such a result.
8(b)(1)(A). Section 8(b)(1)(A) makes it an unfair labor practice
for unions to "restrain or coerce" employees in the exercise of their
section 7 rights.10 5 The Board has held that unions which engage in
discrimination against minority employees violate this section,"0 6 and
the Supreme Court has made the union's fair representation
obligation to employees a part of the Act.' 7 The Court has explicitly
read the duty into section 2 of the Railway Labor Act which contains
language practically identical to section 7.I's It therefore seems logical
to assume that section 7 of the NLRA, in giving employees the right
"to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing," includes not only their right to elect a union to bargain
for them but also their right to be fairly represented by it. A union
which discriminates against a class of employees is "restraining"
them in their section 7 right to fair representation and therefore
violating 8(b)(l)(A).' 0 '
While it is true that Congress did not make the right to fair
representation explicit in section 7, the Board appears to have
sufficient authority to find that the right exists there. The section is
written in very broad language, and has always been interpreted by
the Board according to its judgment as to how best to achieve the
purposes of the Act in the realities of industrial life. On a literal level,
for example, the section, by giving employees the "right to selforganization" coupled with 8(a)(1) which prohibits all employer
104. See Molinar, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination,7 B.C.
IND. &Cown. L. Rav. 601 (1966), where the author argues that what the Board has done in

regard to 8(b)(l)(A) generates a "suspicion of [improper] creativity." Id. at 602.
105. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 101, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(l)(A) (1964).
106. See note 3 supra.
107. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337 (1953); see Syres v. Oil workers
Local 23,350 U.S. 892, rev'gpercuriam, 223 F.2d 739 (1955).
108. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Ry., 323 U.S. 192, 199 (1944). Section Two, Fourth
of the RLA provides in part:
Employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing. The majority of any craft or class of employees
shall have the right to determine who shall be the representative of the craft or class
for purposes of this chapter. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (Fourth) (1964).
109. An alternative argument for finding the duty in section 7 was made by Sovern, Race
Discriminationand The National Labor Relations Act: The Brave New World of Miranda,
N.Y.U. SIXTEENTH ANNUAL CONF. ON LABoR 3, 10-12 (1963).
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"interferences" with section 7 rights, would seem to prohibit all such
interferences." 0 However, the Board has interpreted that section to
permit employer interferences which are justified by the employer's
right to run an efficient business operation."' Similarly, though the
section seems to protect all employee activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining, the Board has established an exception for
activities which are inappropriate, disloyal to the employer, or
unlawful under other legal provisions." 2 The Board's general
approach to section 7 was approved and well-summarized by the
3
Court in Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB:"
The Wagner Act did not undertake the impossible task of specifying in
precise and unmistakable language each incident which would constitute an
unfair labor practice. On the contrary, that Act left to the Board the work
of applying the Act's general prohibitory language in the light of the infinite
combination of events which might be charged as violative of its terms."'

The Board's use of its discretion in making a violation of the duty
of fair representation an unfair labor practice thus appears to be well
founded, for it is enforcing a right which the Supreme Court has
already read into the Act. Additional support for this position comes
from the Preamble of the Taft-Hartley Act which states that it was
a part of the. legislative purpose "to protect the right of individual
employees in their relations with labor organizations.""'
There are two possible bases for attacking this argument. One
critic of the Board's 8(b)(1)(A) theory has noted that 8(a)(1) makes
it an unfair labor practice for employers to "interfere with, restrain
or coerce" employees in their section 7 rights, whereas 8(b)(1)(A)
makes it an unfair labor practice only for unions to "restrain or
coerce" employees in the exercise of those rights. From this, it is
suggested that the Board has less authority to make union behavior
illegal under 8(b)(1)(A) than it has in dealing with employers under
8(a)(l). 1 However, the legislative history of 8(b)(1)(A) indicates that
110.

B. MELTZER, LABOR LAW, CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS

124 (1970).

11I.
See. e.g., Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843 (1943), enforced, 142 F.2d 1009
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 730 (1944).

112. NLRB v. Local 1229, IBEW, 346 U.S. 464 (1953) (disloyal activities); Southern
Steamship Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942) (mutinous activities); NLRB v. Fansteel

Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939) (unlawful sit-down strike); Elk Lumber Co., 91
N.L.R.B. 333 (1950) (partial work stoppage). See also Getman, The Protection of Economic
Pressureby Section 7of the NationalLabor RelationsAct, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 1195 (1967).
113. 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
114. Id. at 798.

115. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 1,29 U.S.C. § 141 (1964).
116. See Molinar, supra note 104, at 607-08.
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the words "interfere with" were dropped solely in deference to the
fears of one Senator that the section might otherwise be interpreted
to make peaceful persuasion of employees by unions illegal." 7 For
purposes of the right to fair representation, the word "restraint" is
virtually synonymous with the word "interfere." "Restrain' is
defined as "to hold back from action, check, curb, limit and
restrict." 8 Employees are clearly "held back, checked, curbed,
limited and restricted" from the full realization of their section 7
rights by the union's failure to represent them fairly.
The second attack comes from the dissenting Board members in
Miranda by their strong emphasis on the Supreme Court decision
in NLRB v. Drivers Local 639."1 The potentially troubling aspect
117. On April 25, 1947, Senator Ives of New York objected to the term "interfere with"
as applied to labor unions in the original version of the section for the following reasons:
Let us consider the words "interfere with." How is a labor organization or anyone,
trying to persuade others to join a labor organization, to operate, under the possible
interpretation of the words "interfere with?" If I, belonging to a union, were to sit down
and try to talk with the Senator from Delaware [Mr. Buck] . . . and if I were to say
to him that I think he should join,. . . doing my utmost to make a persuasive appeal,
perhaps the Senator would not like some feature of my appeal. Possibly somebody might
stir him to anger. . . and cause him to decide to challenge what I was trying to do,
by going to the Labor Relations Board. . . charging an unfair labor practice because
of my interference with what he might consider to be his right. 93 CONG. Rc. 4020
(1947) (emphasis added).
On May 2, Senator Smith explained the reason for dropping the words "interfere with" from
the bill:
I can see nothing in the language used which could possibly be construed as
interfering with the right of solicitation of membership, with legitimate rules being laid
down as to how members should be solicited.
The words "to interfere with" appear under section 8(a) [8(a)(l)], so far as employers
are concerned, and on request of the distinguished Senator from New York [Mr. Ives],
2 days ago by unanimous consent we eliminated those words, because we were afraid
that they might imply that if a fellow member or an agent did something entirely
legitimate, the words "interfere with" might be construed as being sufficiently broad
to prevent that happening.
There is no intention whatever to prevent the legitimate building up of a union
organization.. . .92 CoNG. REc. 4435 (1947).
118. WEBSTlE'S NEw WORLD DICTIONARY 634 (concise ed. 1964).
119. 362 U.S. 274 (1959). In that case, the Court held that the Board could not use section
8(b)(l)(A) to illegalize peaceful recognitional picketing by a union that had been rejected by
a majority of the employees in the plant where the picketing was being conducted. On its facts,
the case is very clearly distinguishable from our situation. The Court noted that the Board
had exceeded its discretion for several reasons. It equated the right to picket with the right to
strike and argued that section 13 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1964), prevented the Board
from interfering with such rights absent specific legislative restrictions. 362 U.S. at 281-82.
The Court also argued from its long tradition of protection of peaceful persuasion. Id. at 279.
It further noted that it was improbable that Congress intended the Board to regulate these
particular activities undersection 8(b)(I)(A) since it had later passed specific legislation covering
the problem. Id. at 282-84, 291-92 (discussing congressional passage of §§ 8(b)(4) and 8(b)(7)).
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of the case is the Court's discussion of the limitations of 8(b)(1)(A),

summarized in the following statement from Justice Brennan's
opinion:
8(b)(1)(A) is a grant of power to the Board limited to authority to proceed
against union tactics involving violence, intimidation and reprisal or threats
thereof-conduct involving more than the general pressures upon persons
employed by the affe6ted employers implicit in economic strikes.' m

The dissent in Mirandaargued that this part of the opinion indicates

that the Board's power under 8(b)(1)(A) is too limited to permit its
use for fair representation violations. 1 ' One commentator has stated
that this opinion shows that "active [union] conduct in the nature
of physical force or distinct threats of direct economic reprisal" are

necessary to have restraint or coercion in violation of the section.'2

The legislative history does show that union activity involving
violence, intimidation and reprisal was a major concern of Congress
in passing 8(b)(1)(A).123 However, there is also evidence of a broader

congressional purpose-to create a greater equivalency in the
liabilities of employers and unions under the Act, and thus, to make

it more equitable. 24 Presumably, if Congress had intended to apply
120. 362 U.S. at 290.
121. 140 N.L.R.B. at 201.
122. Molinar, supra note 104, at 608.
123. Senator Taft in advocating the passage of 8(b)(1)(A) made the following statement:
Why should a union be able to go to an employee and threaten violence if he does
not join the union? Why should a union be able to say to an employee, "If you do
not join this union we will see that you cannot work in the plant ... T" We know that
such things have actually occurred. We know that men have been threatened. 93 CoNo.
REc. 4021 (1947).
The report of supplemental views which announced the intention of ive Senators to propose
the amendment stated their concern that the Act illegalize union violence, coercion and threats
of reprisal against employees and their families in the course of organizing campaigns. S. RP.
No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1947). Arguing in support of the amendment, Senator Ball
cited numerous examples of organizing drives characterized by violence, job reprisals and union
repression. 93 CONG. Rac. 4016-17 (1947).
124. Statements by Senator Taft:
It seems to me that a perfectly clear case of necessity exists to include this amendment
if we wish to secure the equality which the bill aims to give as between employers and
employees. The present law expressly provides, and has provided for many years, that
it is an unfair labor practice for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7. This amendment proposes
to say that it shall also be an unfair laborpracticefor an employee organization, a
union or its agents, to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
rightsguaranteedin Section 7.93 CONG. REC. 4021 (1947) (emphasis added).
lilt is believed that ifwe retain the unfair labor practice procedure against employers,
an effort should be made to bring about some measure of equality by defining unfair
labor practices on the part of labor unions . . . . I see no reason to think it is any
more difficult for the unions than it is for the employer. . . . Id. at 4436.
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8(b)(1)(A) to only "violence, intimidation and reprisal," it would
have specifically indicated that purpose, rather than applying it to
any "restraint" of section 7 rights. In a subsequent case, the Court
has held 8(b)(1)(A) applicable to a situation where the union was not
engaged in the use of force or threatening conduct. 12eA proper reading
of Justice Brennan's remarks, and the Court's opinion in Drivers
Local 639 should be directed at the context in which they were
written-the use of 8(b)(1)(A) in union organizational efforts. The
case, and Justice Brennan's statement, demonstrate the Court's
concern, heavily supported by the legislative history of TaftHartley, 261 that the section not be used as a weapon to impede peaceful
persuasion. Only in that situation was 8(b)(1)(A) held to be limited
to violent or intimidating union action. A proper reading of the case
indicates in context that it is not concerned with union behavior after
organization has been successful, and thus offers no obstacle to the
view that an elected union which unfairly represents minority workers
violates 8(b)(1)(A).
8(b)(2). Section 8(b)(2) makes it illegal for a union to cause or
attempt to cause an employer to violate section 8(a)(3) by
discriminating "in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization."127 The Court has interpreted
these sections broadly to prohibit any encouragement of union
activity or performance of union obligation by discrimination.'2
Although in Miranda29 the Board held that a union which causes
an employer to discriminate against a minority employee violates
8(b)(2), the dissenting Board members and the second circuit3
disagreed, maintaining that 8(b)(2) prohibits only discrimination
based upon a man's union membership or other union-connected
activities, not discrimination based on race or sex or some other nonunion related ground.' 3 1 It is argued that this is a section designed
to "insulate employee jobs from their organizational rights"' 3 -- to
125. ILGW v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961). The union was held guilty of a violation of
8(b)(1)(A) for restraining employees' section 7 rights by signing a contract with the employer
in the mistaken belief that it represented a majority of his employees.
126. Molinar, supra note 104, at 608.
127. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(3), (b)(2) (1964).
128. Radio Officers v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17,39-42 (1953).
129. 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962).
130. NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172, 175-76 (2d Cir. 1963).
131. 140 N.L.R.B.at 193-99.
132. Radio Officers v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17,40 (1953).
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prevent an employee from being punished in his job for failing to
join a union or for some delinquency in his union obligations. Thus,
if an employee is discriminated against for a reason having to do with
his union status, the section is violated. Otherwise, it is not.
A careful analysis of Court decisions interpreting 8(a)(3),
however, indicates that there is strong support for the Board's view.
In a typical case under the section, the Court required a showing of
"scienter" or wrongful motive-that the employer and/or the union
discriminated with the intent to encourage improved union status. 3
Though this is the general rule, there are two special situations where
specific evidence of "bad motive" is not necessary. In these
circumstances the Board balances the harm to employee rights, which
occurs as a result of employer and union discriminatory conduct,
against the justification for such conduct.'34
The first exception concerns a situation where the employer's
discrimination has an especially severe impact in encouraging or
discouraging union activity, which. considerably outweighs the
business justification that the employer offers. In such a case, the
employer is held responsible for violating the section whether or not
a showing of specific wrongful intent is made, since the results of
insufficiently justified discrimination could have been foreseen. He is,
therefore, held responsible for having intended them."' The second
exception was established in NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers,' where
the Court held that if there is discrimination which could result in
some discouragement or encouragement of union activity and there
is no offer of a legitimate and substantial business justification, the
employer will also be held responsible for violating the section without
specific proof that he intended such a result.
The Great Dane doctrine applies very well to the equal
employment situation. If a union causes an employer to discriminate
against an employee on the basis of the latter's race or sex, this
133. Id. at42-44.
134. In NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963), the Court said, in discussing

this situation:
The ultimate problem is the balancing of conflicting legitimate interests. The function
of striking that balance to effectuate national labor policy is often a difficult and delicate
responsibility which the Congress committed primarily to the National Labor Relations
Board, subject to limited judicial review. Id. at 236.
135. Id. at 227. Thus, in Erie Resistor, the Court held that an offer of super-seniority to
striker replacements was unlawful, under the theory discussed in text. Id. at 231.
136. 388 U.S. 26 (1967). In this case, the Court held that a grant of vacation pay only to
non-strikers violated the Act because of the failure of the employer to offer any legitimate
and substantial business justification for the discrimination against strikers. Id. at 35.
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conduct would seem to constitute "discrimination" within the
meaning of 8(a)(3). Despite the argument of the dissenting Board
members in Miranda, the section does not say that the discrimination
with which the section is concerned must be on the basis of union
status; it simply uses the term "discrimination"-that is, distinction
or differentiation without sufficient reason.137 Job distinctions based
on race, ethnic origin or sex, unless the latter is a bona fide
occupational requirement, lack sufficient justification and come
within the term "discrimination" in 8(a)(3). Moreover, under the
Great Dane rationale, such discrimination could very well "encourage
union membership" or activity. The evidence of successful use of
arbitrary union power will make other employees fearful of what the
union may do to them in their employment status if they fail to "toe
the union line." Thus, they will be encouraged to join the union, bow
to the union's authority, and remain in good union status in order
to preserve their jobs. This has the effect of undermining the section's
purpose of assuring employees that their job status is independent
of their union status. Following Great Dane, it is not necessary that
there be specific evidence that the employer or union intended this
result, so long as some possibility of adverse impact on employee
rights was reasonably foreseeable and the employer and union fail
to come forth with any substantial and legitimate justification for
their conduct. It is hard to imagine what legitimate objectives the
employer or union could offer for having engaged in racial, religious,
ethnic or sex discrimination. Thus, we would have discrimination
which encouraged union membership under the Court's interpretation
of 8(b)(2) and 8(a)(3), and such union and employer conduct would,
therefore, be in violation of those sections.'38
Scope of the Miranda Doctrine in Equal Employment Cases
It will be recalled that in Miranda the Board held that a union
which caused an employer to discriminate against a worker had
137. NLRBv. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172, 181 (2d Cir. 1963) (Friendly, J., dissenting).
Although much of the analysis which follows is discussed in Judge Friendly's opinion in
Miranda, it does not discuss the problem in the context of Great Dane which appeared four
years later.
138. The 8(b)(2) / 8(a)(3) theory is only useful as an alternative ground in a situation where
the union is responsible for causing the employer to discriminate or where the two are working
actively in collusion to discriminate against minority workers. The theory is probably
inappropriate where the union is violating its duty of fair representation by passively accepting
employer discrimination while failing to work actively for the interests of minority employees.
In such cases, the union is not "causing" or attempting to cause the employer to discriminate
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committed an unfair labor practice.' Since any union treatment of
an employee on the basis of his minority status involves the use of
an "unfair, irrelevant and invidious" factor, 40 the scope of the
Board's Miranda doctrine is similar to the scope of Title VII."' In
each case the Board must decide whether the union has treated the
complainant on the basis of his race, sex, religion, or national origin.
The doctrine extends to any discrimination in the negotiation of the
collective bargaining agreement,4 2 in its administration," 3 or in the
union's treatment of minority grievances.'4
In Metal Workers Local I [Hughes Tool Co.],"5 the dissenting
Board members argued that this doctrine would lead to excessive
since he has instituted the discrimination himself. Reliance on cases of this type should be placed
upon 8(b)(1)(A). The Board has found 8(b)(2) violations in two cases where the union refused
to prosecute employee grievances. Local No. 12, URW [Business League of Gadsden], 150
N.L.R.B. 312 (1964); Metal Workers Local I [Hughes Tool Co.], 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964).
A proper reading of the statute does not, however, support these findings.
The Board also utilizes section 8(b)(3) of the Act in these cases, arguing that unions which
unfairly represent workers are violating their 8()(3) obligation to bargain in good faith. Local
12, URW, supra; Metal Workers Local I [Hughes Tool Co.], supra. However, the statutory
language and legislative history of the section appear to contradict this view. Unlike 8(b)(I)(A)
and 8(b)(2) the union's obligations under 8(b)(3) appear to run directly to the employer rather
than to the employees. The section itself is written entirely in reference to the union-employer
relationship(0) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization(3)to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer..
The duty to bargain is defined in section 8(d) as the mutual obligation of the employer and
the union to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith. Finally, the legislative
history indicates that the section was designed to place upon the union the same obligation to bargain with the employer that the employer already had in relation to the union.
See JOINT CONGRESSIONAL STUDY COMMITTEE ON LABOR RELATIONS, 80TH CONG., IST SESs.,
REPORT ON FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS ACr OF 1947, 22 (Statement by Senator Taft, 1947).

See also SOvERN 170. However, a union which insisted upon a discriminatory demand in
negotiations in the face of employer opposition might very well violate the section by insisting
to the point of impasse on a non-mandatory, illegal clause. SovERN 170. Cf. NLRB v. BorgWarner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1957).
139. See notes 26-32 supraand accompanying text.
140. 140 N.L.R.B. at 185 (1962).
141. While it is not suggested here that the precedents decided under Title VII would be
absolutely applicable to NLRA cases, they may have considerable relevance by analogy. Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to -2(c)(1) (1964) also prohibits
discrimination in union membership policies. Such discrimination has not been made an unfair
labor practice under the NLRA; however, it may lead to the Board's refusing to certify a union,
rescinding a union's existing certification, and withdrawing the Act's other protections. See
SOVERN 156-60.

142.
143.
144.
145.

Steele v. Louisville &Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962).
147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964).
Id.
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interference with the discretion of unions and to the Board's sitting
in judgment on the substantive matters of collective bargaining, a
practice the Court has specifically condemned."' In the minority
discrimination context, however, that argument is specious. The
union's right to exercise discretion in selection of economic weapons "
and bargaining strategy, 4 and to make relevant differences in
contract bargaining among the employees it represents," cannot be
equated with a right to engage in racial, religious or sex
discrimination. 50 Although fair representation decisions have
recognized the union's considerable latitude in making judgments
based on economic factors,' it is possible for the Board to pay
considerable deference to that discretion and still prohibit union
discrimination. If it finds that a union decision is based on differences
in skill, experience or any other relevant factors, Wiranda would not
permit the Board to substitute its judgment for the union's. Insofar
as the decision was based on the employee's minority status, however,
the Board could find an unfair labor practice. By enforcing this
limitation on the union's discretion, the Board is clearly acting
consistently, not in opposition, with the Court's interpretation of the
Act.
In remedying an unfair labor practice, the Board is authorized
to take "such affirmative action

[Act]."'5 2

.

.

as will effectuate the policies

of the
In individual instances of discrimination, the orders
might simply require the unions to terminate their discrimination,5 3
give active representation to minority employees,' 54 or pay damages
to victims of union discrimination who lose work opportunities. 55 The
Board's remedial power is also sufficiently broad to permit more
146. Id. at 1589-90.
147. NLRB v.Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
148. See generally NLRB v. vooster Division of Borg-warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958);
NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1951).
149. See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337-38 (1945).
150. To the extent that the union's discretion is limited in this regard, the limitation has
been stated as follows:
[Tihe statutory power to represent a craft and to make contracts as to wages, hours
and working conditions does not include the authority to make among members of the
craft discriminations not based on such relevant differences . . . .[D]iscriminations
based on race alone are obviously irrelevant and invidious. Steele v. Louisville &
Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 203 (1944).
151. See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330,337-38 (1945).
152. National Labor Relations Act § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964).
153. Local 12, URW [Business League of Gadsden], 150 N.L.R.B. 312,323 (1964).
154. Id.
155. Houston Maritime Ass'n, 168 N.L.R.B. 615, 619 (1967).
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imaginative remedies in cases of extensive union discriminatory
practices. Thus, it can decertify a discriminating union thereby
depriving the union of the Act's other protections."' Moreover, it is
probably authorized to order major changes in union hiring hall
systems and alterations in a plant's seniority system'- 7 to effectuate
the Act's policies by removing the present effects of prior
discrimination. In this respect, the Board's remedial powers would
appear to be very similar to those of federal district courts operating
under Title VII.158 A number of innovative Title VII remedial
measures recently adopted by the courts appear to be equally
appropriate for NLRA violations."'
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MINORITIES

As

EMPLOYER UNFAIR LABOR

PRACTICES
6 in Union
Joint Employer Liability"
DiscriminationCases

The NLRA also has considerable potential as a weapon against
employer discrimination in unionized plants. When a union makes
a discriminatory demand and the employer goes along with the union
156. See cases cited in note 32 supra.See also SOVERN 156-60.
157. The General Counsel has issued an unfair labor practice complaint against a union
hiring hall in an effort to force it to keep job applicants regularly informed of work
opportunities. 76 BNA LAB. REL. REP. 107 (1971). The Board could require that such
information be given to minority job applicants as part of its remedy.
To invoke such a remedy, it might be necessary to secure jurisdiction over the employer
by a finding that the employer was jointly liable for an unfair labor practice because of his
involvement in the union discrimination. See notes 160-65 infra and accompanying text.
158. The Board's powers may be broader than judicial authority under Title VII because
of the special limiting provisions in the latter statute under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(h), (j)
(1964).
159. In Insulators Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047, 1051, 1055 (5th Cir. 1969) the
remedial order under Title VII required alternating black and white referrals for work. In
several other decisions, the courts have required considerable changes in existing seniority
systems to remove the present effects of prior discrimination. Dobbins v. Electrical Workers
Local 212, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968); United States v. Papermakers Local 189, 282
F. Supp. 39 (E.D. La. 1968), aff'd, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919
(1970); Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
In a speech before the Colorado Bar Association on May 13, 1971, the National Labor
Director of the NAACP called on the Board to disestablish discriminating unions. He argued
that the Board's constitutional responsibilities require that it go beyond anything it has done
thus far. 77 BNA LAB. REL. REP. 88, 93-94,95-96 (1971).
160. Dean Sovern, discussing this problem, uses the term "derivative" employer liability.
SOVERN 154. 1 use the term "joint employer liability" because I believe that the designation,
derivative liability, may imply that the employer's responsibility must arise out of a prior
discriminatory act by the union. As argued in the text, I believe that there are possibilities
for the employer's being jointly liable with the union even when he instigates the discrimination
himself.
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request, the Board has found that he has committed a derivative
unfair labor practice."' For example, if the employer complies with
a union request to place arbitrary limits on the advancement of female
employees, he has violated 8(a)(1) by cooperating with the union and
thereby contributing substantially to the interference with the rights
of female workers to fair representation. He has also violated 8(a)(3)
under the 8(b)(2)/8(a)(3) theory since it is the employer's act of
discrimination caused by the union against which these sections are
ultimately directed.
A somewhat more difficult question arises in a situation where
the employer establishes discriminatory working conditions and the
union fails to resist them. Assume, for instance, that the employer
refuses arbitrarily to promote female employees above a certain level
and the union fails to actively oppose the discrimination. The
8(b)(2)/8(a)(3) theory clearly is inapplicable since it cannot be said
that the union has "caused" the employer to discriminate. A strong
argument can be made, however, that here, also, the employer has
violated 8(a)(1) because he and the union are jointly and inextricably
implicated in the wrong which has been committed. The employer
has in such a case contributed substantially to the interference with
the employee's section 7 rights to fair representation by creating the
conditions under which the union discrimination occurred. Moreover,
since the employer and union jointly negotiate and administer the
collective bargaining agreement, it would probably be impossible in
most cases to separate one's responsibility from the other's.16 3 As long
as both are acting arbitrarily, each is supporting the other's conduct
and they should be held jointly responsible. The Board seems to be
leaning in the direction of reaching this result."6
This conclusion is highly desirable because of the need to fashion
161. 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962). See Richardson v. Texas & New Orleans R.R., 242 F.2d
230, 236 (5th Cir. 1957) in which employer liability was found in a duty of fair representation
derivative suit.
162. See 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962).
163. A perfect example of this is found in the case of Local 12, URW [Business League
of Gadsden], 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964). The collective bargaining agreements never contained
discriminatory clauses over a period of twenty years. Nevertheless, through covert employer
and union cooperation, the plant had racially segregated dining, toilet and recreation facilities,
and employment opportunities were divided into "white" jobs and "black" jobs. There was
no possible way to allocate responsibility for the discrimination between the employer and union
other than to say that both were seriously implicated.
164. See id. at 316 where a union was found to have arbitrarily failed to negotiate fairly
for Negroes or prosecute the grievances of black workers. There, the Board stated:
The Company has an additional duty under the Act, which it apparently overlooked,
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meaningful remedies for union discrimination in such cases. The
Board would be seriously limited in its remedial powers if it could
issue orders only against the union. It could order the union to
actively pursue an employee's grievance or pay damages for work
opportunities which the employee loses as a result of the union's
failure, but the former may be an unrealistic remedy in light of the
union's past hostility or indifference toward the employee. Moreover,
by the time the Board issues its remedy, it may be too late for active
representation to be meaningful. Also, damages may not provide
adequate relief. By finding the employer liable, however, the Board
can assume jurisdiction over him and issue affirmative relief requiring
reinstatement and promotions in appropriate situations." 5
This theory has wide implications because it would make any
employer discrimination against minorities in a unionized plant a
potential unfair labor practice. It should serve primarily to give the
Board meaningful power to deal with union discrimination. Its
applicability, however, should be limited to situations in which it is
first proven that the union has violated its duty of fair representation.
Unless such a showing is made, there would be no basis for finding
employer liability on the theory of joint inteference with employee
rights. Instead, consideration would have to be given in such cases
to one of the possibilities for independent employer liability.
Independent Employer Unfair LaborPractices
The major developments regarding the Board's role in the equal
employment area in recent years have occurred in cases in which the
sole issue was employer discrimination where no questions of union
complicity were raised. These cases have created the possibility of the
Act's becoming a full-fledged equal employment statute, equally
usable against employers and unions. In analyzing the problems in
this area, it is important to note that by treating the NLRA in terms
not to enter into or accept the benefits of discriminatory agreements with the Respondent
[union].
The Board then cited the following statement from Richardson v. Texas & New Orleans R.R.,
242 F.2d 230, 236 (5th Cir. 1957):
It takes two parties to reach an agreement, and both have a legal obligation not to
make or enforce an agreement or discriminatory employment practice which they either
know, or should know, is unlawful. Unless financial responsibility for a joint breach
of such duty is required from both sides of the bargaining table, the statutory policy
implied under Steele will be impracticable of enforcement. For the foregoing reasons,
we think the Brotherhood's obligation under the statute does not exist in vacuo,
unsupported by any commensurate duty on the part of the carrier.
165. See Richardson v. Texas & New Orleans R.R., 242 F.2d 230, 235-36 (5th Cir. 1957).
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of its own language, legislative history, and administrative and
judicial development, the Act has special limitations which are not
present in civil rights statutes.
Much of the argument favoring a vigorous role for the Board in
union discrimination cases is based on the Board's special
constitutional responsibilities in that area. 6 ' It is useful, therefore,
to ask whether similar constitutional questions arise in cases of
employer discrimination. To the extent that an employer is
cooperating with a union's violation of its duty of fair representation,
he may share responsibility for the infringement of his employees'
constitutional rights. If he is acting independently, however, his
conduct is not subject to constitutional regulation -it simply cannot
be maintained that governmental action or support exists in a case
of independent employer discrimination. The NLRA, rather than
delegating governmental authority to an employer, takes power from
him. Where he previously had authority to establish his own
employment conditions-or at least to make his own decision as to
whether to deal with a union -the Act's passage narrows his power
by forcing acceptance of the union as a joint partner in employment
relations decisions. Absent governmental support for discrimination,
there is no basis for finding constitutional duty. 67 Thus, there could
not have been a Steele decision in a case of independent employer
discrimination, and the Board has no special constitutional
responsibility in those situations. Any NLRB involvement in such
cases, therefore, must be supported by the more explicit statutory
policies of the Act.
Employer Refusal to Bargain When Union Demands Elimination
of DiscriminatoryWorking Conditions. In Packinghouse Workers,16
the Board held that an employer violates section 8(a)(5) if he refuses
to agree to a union request to bargain regarding the elimination of
discriminatory working conditions. This result is undoubtedly
correct. Such terms clearly fall within the section 8(d) definition of
terms requiring mandatory bargaining--"wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment." '69 In the interest of public
policy, the Board has quite properly given a broad construction to
166. See notes 33-59 supra and accompanying text.
167. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
168. Farmers' Coop. Compress (United Packinghouse Workers), 169 N.L.R.B. 290 (1968),

revised and affd, 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969).
169. National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964); see NLRB v.
Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
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what constitutes working conditions in discrimination cases. Thus,
8(a)(5) requires bargaining on union request about discrimination in
washroom and cafeteria facilities as well as about discrimination in
the use of the company golf course.1 0 However, the correct remedy
for a violation under 8(a)(5) is an order to the employer to discuss
these issues with the union-not an order for the removal of the
discriminatory conditions. The Board has power under 8(a)(5) to
order discussion but, as the Court has recently affirmed,' it does
not have the power to compel an agreement or require the making
of concessions. This limitation on the Board's power is codified in
section 8(d) 1 2 and expresses a clear congressional policy to protect
the employer's right to bargain free from excessive Board
interference. The discrimination itself, while violative of Title VII,
would not be within the purview of the NLRA.
Employer Interference with Concerted Activities. In addition to
protecting organizational and unionization activities, the Act
contains a related but independent policy under section 7 which
protects employees in other concerted activities for "mutual aid or
protection." 1 3 This policy raises the possibility that employer
interference with a concerted minority effort to achieve better working
conditions will be an unfair labor practice under 8(a)(1). Because the
Packinghouse theory would have enormous implications in this area,
we shall defer consideration of that theory,17 and consider first a more
traditional interpretation of the NLRA. There are two broad
categories of cases in this area. The first concerns employee efforts
to improve working conditions for minorities where no union is
present. The second relates to situations where an elected union
representative is present and the employees choose to act
independently of it.
1. Concerted Employee Activities in a Non-Unionized Situation.
In Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co.,'"5 two black carpenters"7 '
170. In Local 12, URW [Business League of Gadsden], 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964) the Board

held that the union violated its 8(b)(3) obligation by failing to bargain with the employer to
integrate all of these facilities, arguing that they were all working conditions. Id. at 317-19.
If they are working conditions for purposes of 8(b)(3), they come within 8(d) and are also
undoubtedly working conditions under 8(b)(3)'s correlative-8(a)(5).
171. In H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970), the Court held that the Board
lacked authority to remedy an 8(a)(5) violation by ordering a dues check-off provision that
the union had requested.

172. National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
173. Id. § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
174. See notes 209-25 infra and accompanying text.
175. 79 N.L.R.B. No. 71,72 L.R.R.M. 1372 (1969).
176. The two employees involved were unionized carpenters. It would have been possible
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sought employment from a segregated construction company,
informing the job foreman and project manager that they were
engaged in an effort to increase job opportunities for black carpenters
in the St. Louis area. Thereafter, the project manager instructed the
foreman to hire minority personnel in all craft classifications. The
two blacks involved in the initial request were told that no vacancies
existed, but within a short time other black carpenters were hired.
The Board concluded that these two were discriminated against
because of their involvement in a protected effort and ordered the
employer to hire them.
This decision is supported by a long line of judicial and Board
precedents protecting non-union concerted employee activities. 177 In
general, the rules relating to protection of minority pressures will be
the same as those regarding protected activities by other employees. 7 8
In New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co.,'79 the Court gave
express recognition to the fact that federal labor policies protecting
workers involved in "labor disputes" encompass those who are
engaged in protests against racial and, presumably, other types of
minority job discrimination. Thus, in a typical situation, blacks who
were fired for picketing to protest discriminatory promotion policies
of their employer would be entitled to reinstatement.
It is important to note, however, that the concern of section 7 is
with the protection of the protest -not the elimination of the
underlying racial discrimination. Thus, an appropriate remedial order
would simply require a return to the status quo before the protestors
were fired. If blacks were engaged in menial jobs prior to the firing,
the order would require their return to those jobs. The Act's policies
would not support an order directing the employer to yield on the
question in contention-the fair advancement of blacks to higher-level
for the Board to analyze this case from the same perspective that the Ninth Circuit used in
NLRB v. Tanner Livery, Ltd., 419 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1969), discussed at notes 197-208 infra
and accompanying text. Thus, the Board could have considered the problem of whether the
carpenters should have worked through their union in their efforts. Since the Board's opinion
did not consider this question, the case is treated here as one dealing only with the general
question of the Act's protection of concerted minority efforts to improve working opportunities.
177. NLRB v. Washington Al. Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962); NLRB v. KDI Precision Prod.,
Inc., 436 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1971); Electromec Design & Dev. Co. v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 631
(9th Cir. 1969); G & W Elec. Spec. Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 1136 (1965).
178. For a comprehensive discussion of these rules, see Getman, The Protection of
Economic Pressure by Section 7 of the NationalLabor Relations Act, 115 U. PA. L. REv.
1195 (1967).
179. 303 U.S. 552 (1938). The case concerned the applicability of Norris La-Guardia
protections to picketing against job discrimination.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1971:833

positions. As far as the NLRA is concerned, such an order would
be comparable to an economic strike situation in which the Board
not only required that fired strikers be reinstated but also forced the
employer to yield on their demands for higher wages. In both
situations, the NLRA requires that the outcome of the question in
conflict be determined by a free economic clash.' In this respect, it
differs from statutes designed expressly for civil rights purposes where
the remedy would include the removal of all elements of job
discrimination.
A further distinction between the NLRA and express equal
employment statutes lies in the requirement that the employees be

involved in "concerted" efforts. Though a single employee certainly
can come within section 7's purview, he must be engaged in activity
which is designed to induce group action. 81 Thus, an employee who
is fired for complaining about bad employment conditions is
unprotected,8 2 while a worker conversing with another for the purpose
of stimulating group protest is protected.Iss Significantly, this means
that the simplest and most typical situations covered by other equal

employment statutes-an employer's discriminatory act in demoting,
discharging or refusing to hire particular employees because of their
race or sex-normally falls outside the concern of section 7 because
it does not involve a question of concerted employee activities.
The Board has recently decided an interesting case concerning the
right of employees to be protected in their efforts on behalf of
minority workers of another employer. In Building Service
8 4 a female union
Employees,"
organizer was serving outside her
regular job as the president of Radical Women, an organization
whose function was to improve the status of female employees. The
180. See National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964): "to bargain
collectively. . . does not require either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of
a concession." See generally H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970); American Ship
Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965); NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S.
477 (1960).
181. Indiana Gear Works v. NLRB, 371 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1967); Johanna Cotton Mills
v. NLRB, 176"F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1949). This requirement was defined in Mushroom Transp.
Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1964) as follows:
[A] conversation may constitute a concerted activity although it involves only a
speaker and a listener, but to qualify as such, it must appear at the very least that it
was engaged in with the object of initiating or inducing or preparing for group action
or that it had some relation to group action in the interests of employees. Id. at 685.
182. Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d at 685.
183. Salt River Valley Water Users Ass'n v. NLRB, 206 F.2d 325 (9th Cir. 1953); NLRB
v. Schwartz, 146 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1945).
184. 188 N.L.R.B. No. 141, 76 L.R.R.M. 1467 (1971).
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union-employer objected to her activities in this capacity, arguing that
they brought disrepute on the union. The organizer was fired when
her supervisor saw a newspaper story which reported her arrest in a
demonstration against job discrimination. The Board held that she
was engaged in a protected activity and ordered her reinstatement.
A long series of Board and court cases supports the view of this
case that the terms "concerted activities" for "mutual aid and
protection" under section 7 include efforts by employees on behalf
of workers of other employers.les The Act explicitly indicates that for
labor dispute purposes the term employee is not "limited to
employees" of a particular employer,"' so that employees of different
employers are protected in working together for their "mutual aid."
This policy has particular applicability in the minority worker
context. Any successful effort to break down discrimination barriers
in one company or industry is likely to have a beneficial impact in
others. Thus, the NLRA protects minority workers from punitive
action by their employer for their civil rights activities in combating
job discrimination.
An interesting question is whether this policy should extend to
protection of employees in their non-employment civil rights efforts.
For instance, is a black worker who is fired because the employer
disapproves of his outside activity with housing or school integration
committees entitled to reinstatement? The worker could argue that
there is a strong relationship between job discrimination and biased
practices in other areas. As blacks achieve better educational and
living conditions, their job opportunities will also increase. Thus, nonemployment civil rights activities of minority workers are
substantially related to their "mutual aid and protection" as
employees and ought to be protected by the Act.
Though the argument is an appealing one, it ought to be rejected.
The prededents construing the scope of section 7 are clearly against
it. All of the decisions in the area of protected employee activities
have shown a considerable concern that the activity's objective be
directly related to employment conditions. 187 In its major
185. NLRB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1942);
Fort Wayne Corrugated Paper Co. v. NLRB, I1 I F.2d 869 (7th Cir. 1940); Cyril de Cordova
& Bros., 91 N.L.R.B. 1121 (1950).

186. National Labor Relations Act § 2(9),29 U.S.C. § 152(9) (1964).
187. See American Art Clay Co. v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 88 (7th Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Dobbs
Houses, Inc., 325 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d
983 (7th Cir. 1948); Plastelite Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 180 (1965).
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pronouncement in this area, the Court also seemed to indicate that
to be protected the activity concerned must grow out of a labor
dispute"'8 -that is, "a controversy concerning, terms, tenure or
conditions of employment." ' 9 Most courts have held that employee
strikers who seek to have supervisors reinstated are engaged in an
area which is outside their immediate interest and within traditional
managerial prerogatives."' 0 At least as strong a case can be made in
that situation for the argument that the employee objective has an
impact on employment conditions. Finally, decisions under section
7 have balanced employees' rights against policies favoring the
employer's traditional freedom to operate his own business,101 and
several cases have recognized the employer's power to make entirely
arbitrary discharges.1 The danger of a holding that employers are
prohibited by the NLRA from discharging employees for their
involvement in general civil rights work is that it would open a
Pandora's box. Logically extended, it would mean that employers
would no longer be free to fire employees on the basis that they were
involved in communist, fascist, socialist, Democratic, Republican or
any other political or economic activities because all such groups
intend ultimately to have an impact on working conditions in this
country. Available evidence indicates that Congress never intended
the Wagner Act to have such far-reaching impact in destroying the
traditional employer prerogative to select his work forces.1 13
188. NLRB v. Washington Al. Co., 370 U.S. 9, 15 (1962).
189. National Labor Relations Act § 2(9), 29 U.S.C. § 152(9) (1964).
190. See, e.g., American Art Clay Co. v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 88 (7th Cir. 1964); Dobbs
Houses, Inc. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1963); Cleaver-Brooks Mfg. Corp. v. NLRB,
264 F.2d 637 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 817 (1959). The Board protects employee protests
over the removal of a supervisor when the "identity and capability of the supervisor involved
has a direct impact on the employees' own job interests and on their performance of the work
they are hired to do." Dobbs Houses, Inc., 135 N.L.R.B. 885, 888 (1962) vacated, 325 F.2d
531 (5th Cir. 1963). See also Getman, The Protection of Economic Pressureby Section 7 of
the National LaborRelationsAct, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 1195, 1211-18 (1967).
191. See, e.g., NLRB v. Union Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357 (1958); NLRB v. Babcock &
Vilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956); NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333
(1938); Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333 (1950).
192. Hagopian & Sons, Inc. v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 947, 950-51 (6th Cir. 1968); NLRB v.
United Parcel Service, Inc., 317 F.2d 912, 914 (1st Cir. 1963); NLRB v. MeGahey, 233 F,2d
406, 413 (5th Cir. 1956).
193. Senator Walsh made the following statement in seeking passage of the Wagner Act:
Mr. President, there are some fundamental rights an employer has, just as there are
rights an employee has. No one can compel an employer to keep his factory open. No
one can compel an employer to pay any particular wage. No one can compel an employer
to hire others in addition to those he sees fit to hire. ...
So in dealing with this bill we have to recognize those fundamental things, and we
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2. Concerted Employee Activities in Unionized Situation. When
employees engage in an independent protest in a unionized plant
without union authorization, special problems arise regarding
whether the conduct should be protected. After a collective bargaining
representative is selected, the assumption of the NLRA is that there
is an adequate vehicle through which most employee protests can be
channeled. Moreover, independent employee efforts cause some
concern that the union's status as exclusive bargaining representative
will be undermined.194 Most of the cases in this area have arisen in
wildcat strike situations. The courts have generally held such strikes
are unprotected,' while the Board has protected the strikers when
it has found an identity between their objectives and those of the
union. 9 '

In Tanner Motor Livery Ltd. 97 two white drivers, active in civil
rights work, were found to have been discharged for picketing in
protest against their company's failure to hire a black driver. The
Board held that such conduct was protected, citing New Negro
Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 9 ' and ordered that the employees
be reinstated. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the
Board for consideration of the question of whether these employees
were required to file their protests through their union."' The court
put the question as follows: "to what extent does Section 9(a) [making
the union the exclusive bargaining representative] limit or remove the
protection afforded by Section 7?' ' 2o On remand, the Board applied

its general approach to independent employee action in unionized
plants. 2 1 It stated that the conduct should be protected because it
have not gone into that domain. All we do is to remove the barriers that have kept
employees away from their employer, which have prevented collective bargaining, which
have resulted in strikes without any attempt to negotiate. All we have done is to promote
the orderly processes of collective bargaining. 79 CoNG. Rac. 7673 (1935).
In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1936), the Court said that "[t]he Act
does not interfere with the normal right of the employer to select its employees or to discharge
them." Id. at 45. See also NLRB v. Superior Co., 199 F.2d 38,42 (6th Cir. 1952).
194. See Getman, supra note 190, at 1197.
195. NLRB v. Shop Rite Foods, Inc., 430 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1970); Plasti-Line, Inc. v.
NLRB, 278 F.2d 482 (6th Cir. 1960); NLRB v. Draper Corp., 145 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1944).

ContraNLRB v. R.C. Can Co., 328 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1964).
196. Sunbeam Lighting Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1248 (1962), enforcement denied, 318 F.2d 661

(7th Cir. 1963). See generally Gould, The Status of Unauthorizedand "'Wildcat" Strikes Under
the NationalLabor Relations Act, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 672 (1967).
197. 148 N.L.R.B. 1402 (1964).
198. 303 U.S. 552 (1938).
199. 349 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1965).
200. Id. at 3.
201. 166 N.L.R.B. 551 (1967).
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assumed that the union was acting lawfully and therefore shared the
objective of the employees to eliminate racial discrimination in the
company. Thus, whether the employees filed a grievance with the
union was irrelevant because under the Board's view, even
independent employee action is protected when it is consistent with
general union goals. On a second appeal, the Ninth Circuit rejected
23
the Board's theory, 22 interpreting a long series of judicial opinions
to mean that independent employee action requires specific union
authorization in order to be protected. The case was remanded to
determine whether the employer had an obligation to inform the
employees of the requirement that they file their grievances with the
04
union before dismissing them.
Commentators have questioned the Board's assumption that
independent employee actions do not undermine the exclusive power
of the union simply because there is an identity of union-employee
objectives. 2 5 It is contended, for example, that a disruption in the
union's time plan for a strike caused by a wildcat walkout in support
of the union's economic objectives may destroy the union's entire
strike strategy.06 In line with this criticism, the majority of courts
appear to be rejecting the Board's theory. Nevertheless, whatever the
relative merits of the Board and court positions in a wildcat strike
context, both were incorrect in Tanner Livery in assuming that these
policies should be applied absolutely to minority worker protests. The
assumptions behind the creation of rules for wildcat strikes simply
do not apply in the equal employment opportunity area. Given the
vast evidence which documents discrimination by union insiders
against minority group members, 27 it cannot be assumed that the
union is an adequate forum for the expression and fulfillment of
minority interests. To the extent that discrimination against
minorities exists in a company, the union as co-negotiator and
administrator of the collective bargaining agreement may be as
responsible as the company for it and equally interested in its
202. NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery Ltd., 419 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1969).

203. See note 195 supra.
204. A lengthy discussion of the Tanner Livery case is contained in Gould, Black Power
in the Unions: The Impact Upon Collective Bargaining Relationships, 79 YALE L.J. 46, 57-

72 (1969).
205. Gould, supranote 196, at 685-88. See also Getman, supra note 190, at 1246.47.
206. Gould, supranote 196, at 687.
207. See Hill, The Racial Practices of Organized Labor: The Contemporary Record, in
THE NEGRO AND THE AMERICAN LABOR MARKET 286-358 (1968). See generally F. MARSHALL
& V. BRIGGS, THE NEGRO AND APPRENTICESHIP (1967); R. MARSHALL, THE NEGRO AND
ORGANIZED LABOR (1965).
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continuance. When minorities are working to eliminate
discrimination which exists in a plant, they cannot be considered to
be undermining the union's role for they are doing precisely what
the union ought to be doing for them in fulfillment of its duty of
fair representation. The likelihood that unions are violating their duty
of fair representation-either actively or passively-in cases of
independent minority protest, is very great. The facts in Tanner
Livery indicate a possibility that the union was, in fact, violating its
duty in that case. 28 The Board and courts, both of which ignored
this issue in Tanner Livery, should be keenly concerned about this
possibility in every such case they consider.
In a Tanner Livery situation, the Board should not apply its
normal wildcat striker rules and protect the activity only when the
union and protestors have common objectives. A situation in which
the union was supporting existing discrimination and opposing the
goals of the minority workers would be the very strongest possible
case for protection of the independent minority efforts. Moreover,
the courts should not require in all such cases that grievances be filed
with the union, for this implies that the minority workers have an
obligation to delay their efforts until the union takes action. An
unsympathetic union could kill the protest by long delay or
lackadaisical pursuit of the employees' interest. Instead, the Board
should first attempt to determine whether discriminatory practices
do, in fact, exist. If they do, the minority protest should be protected
unless there is evidence that the union is engaged in its own vigorous
program to remove the discrimination. When the union is actively
opposing the discrimination through a plan of its own, the minority
protest should not be allowed because it might, then, undermine the
union's strategy. In the absence of such a program, the ultimate
Board decision might properly include not only an order protecting
208. In Tanner Livery, the union first refused to process the grievances of a driver who
was discharged for his civil rights efforts and then later joined the company in deciding that
he was not entitled to reinstatement. The evidence indicated that the union sympathized with
the employer's position. Gould, supra note 204, at 57, 60. In Emporium and western Addition
Community Org., 192 N.L.R.B. No. 14,77 L.R.R.M. 1669 (1971), the Board refused to protect
picketing by a group of blacks which was designed to eliminate employer racial discrimination.
The Board's result was based on the view that the employees should have worked through
the union which was already protesting the discrimination on its own, though apparently in a
very slow and deliberate manner. The majority opinion is very brief, essentially an adoption
of the trial examiner's views. However, an argument can be made that the 3-2 decision marks
an even stronger Board posture against independent ninority protests than Tanner Livery, for
the Board might have protected this picketing, like the picketing in Tanner, on the basis that
the employees and the union were united in their "objectives" and disagreed only about
"means."
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the minority protest but also a finding that the union was committing
an unfair labor practice by failing to represent the minority workers
adequately. In such a case, appropriate remedial orders could be
issued against the union as well as against the employer.
Employer Discrimination in the Absence of Concerted
Protest-PackinghouseWorkers. In United Packinghouse, Food &
Allied Workers v. NLRB,2 °9 there was evidence that a cotton
processor employer was engaged in extensive racial discrimination
against black and Latin American workers. The Board held that his
refusal to bargain with the union regarding the elimination of these
conditions violated 8(a)(5).210 On appeal, the union argued that the
discriminatory practices violated section 8(a)(1) and (3). Somewhat
surprisingly, the District of Columbia Circuit Court agreed with the
union's 8(a)(1) theory. The court argued that a pattern of invidious
discrimination sets up a clash of interests between minorities and
other workers, reducing their ability to work together and produces
in its victims an apathy which inhibits them from asserting their
section 7 rights. The court believed "that the confluence of these two
factors sufficiently deterred the exercise of Section 7 rights as to
violate Section 8(a)(l)." 2 11 The case was remanded to the Board to
determine whether an invidious pattern of employer discrimination
existed.
As previously indicated, 212 the Packinghouse view could have
considerable impact in removing limitations on the Board's role in
equal employment cases. Under its theory, the NLRA could also have
enhanced remedial power. It could go beyond the protection of
concerted protests to orders requiring the removal of all elements of
employment discrimination in a company on the basis that such
discrimination stifles section 7 rights. Moreover, it could handle
complaints of employment discrimination even absent concerted
protest since the mere existence of discriminatory conditions would
be a violation of the Act. Although the Packinghouseopinion speaks
only of situations in which a pattern of discrimination exists in a
company, the doctrine might be extended in the future to individual
acts of discrimination, because such acts also create a cleavage
between minority employees and others and contribute to minority
apathy.
209.
210.
211.
212.

416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969).
169 N.L.R.B. 290 (1968).
416 F.2d at 1135.
See notes 5-15 supra and accompanying text.
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The most significant aspect of the Packinghouse opinion is its
concern for the protection of the potential conditions for concerted
activities. Unlike the Tanner Livery,213 Mason &Hanger-SilasMason
Co.21 4 and Building Service Employees21 5 cases, the court in
Packinghouse was not concerned with situations in which minority
employees were actually protesting, striking or picketing to improve
their position. In fact, Packinghouseseems primarily directed toward
cases where such protest activities are not occurring because minority
employees have been too intimidated to assert themselves.
It is difficult to find precedent supporting the view that the Board
should protect employees' potential psychological attitudes toward
concerted activities. The Packinghouse opinion does not cite relevant
case authority, but rather relies, primarily, upon the analyses of
several sociologists concerning the impact of discrimination on
employee attitudes.216 Although there have been situations in which
the Board has been concerned with the psychological effect of
employer action on employee attitudes, most such cases have occurred
in a unionization context where the employer made threats or took
punitive action against workers in an effort to discourage them from
supporting union activity.2 17 These situations are clearly
distinguishable from Packinghouse. First, they deal directly with the
employees' rights to unionize-a more central and primary concern
of the Act than the right to engage in concerted activity in general.218
Secondly, they concern situations where collective activity is already
occurring.
Unlike the union discrimination situation, the NLRA has no
special concern with independent employer discrimination against
minorities. Therefore, the sole basis for the Board's involvement in
Packinghouse is the Act's policy favoring protection of concerted
activities in general. This means that if the court's position is sound,
213. 148 N.L.R.B. 1402 (1964).
214. 179 N.L.R.B. No.71,72 L.R.R.M. 1372 (1969).

215. 188 N.L.R.B. No. 141,76 L.R.R.M. 1467 (1971).
216. 416 F.2d at 1136-38. The court cited K. CLARK, DARK GHETTO (1965); G. MYRDAL,
AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 391-92 (1944); and H. WITMER & R. KOTINSKY, PERSONALITY IN THE
MAKING Ch. VI (1952).

217. See. e.g., Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965) (partial shut-

down as threat against union activity); NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405 (1964)
(promise of benefits before union election construed as threat that benefits would dry up if
union was elected); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963) (adverse psychological
impact on union activity as result of super-seniority offer to strike replacements); NLRB v.
Golub Corp., 388 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1967) (threats against unionization).
218. See National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
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it would be necessary to extend it beyond minority problems. Thus,
any employer who arbitrarily classifies his employees and establishes
harsh and unfair working conditions for certain groups would also
be violating 8(a)(1). For instance, if he paid one group of his
maintenance workers at extremely low, unfair rates and subjected
them to excessively harsh working conditions, he would be interfering
with their section 7 rights. These workers are also capable of
becoming apathetic and docile under the employer's tyranny. A
cleavage would also be created between their interests and those of
the other employees, reducing the likelihood of their working in
concert. The Packinghouse court seems to be arguing that blacks and
other minorities are more likely to develop apathetic attitudes as the
result of discrimination than are other workers. 219 The sociologists
the court relied upon in reaching this judgment, however, were writing
about minority attitudes in periods earlier than the 1970's.220 The
emergence of the black power movement, the new sense of "La Raza"
and "La Causa" in the Mexican-American community and women's
liberation makes one suspect that a psychological reaction of
indignation and minority pride may be just as likely as a reaction
of docility today.2'1 These reactions may spur concerted protests
rather than prevent them. Even if general sociological conditions
indicate that job discrimination more deeply disturbs minority
workers psychologically, they may also indicate that there is more
likelihood of community action by such workers. Groups of minority
employees have a natural cohesion and common bond that other
workers lack. It is therefore impossible to say that employer
discrimination has a more chilling impact on minority concerned
action than on non-minority group efforts. If the former are covered
by the Packinghouse doctrine, the latter should also be covered. The
union duty of fair representation theory necessarily extends beyond
minority employees to arbitrary union action toward any workers.
The Packinghouse theory would have to be similarly extended.
Therefore, it would take the Board into a new area of responsibilitythe general surveillance of working conditions to ensure that proper
circumstances for the realization of concerted protests exist.
219. See416 F.2d at 1135 n.!5.
220. See note 207 supra. Kenneth Clark was concerned with the early 1960's, Witmer &

Kotinsky with the early 1950's, and Gunnar Myrdal wrote about black attitudes in the 1940's.
221. See generally J. BURMA, MEXICAN-AMERICANS INTHE UNITED STATES 279-324 (1970);
R. ENDO, W. STRAWBRIDGE, PERSPECTIVES ON BLACK AMERICA 182-203 (1970); R. YOUNG,
ROOTS OF REBELLION-THE EvoLUTION OF BLACK POLITICS AND PROTEST SINCE WORLD WAR
11 (1970); Komisar, The New Feminism, SATURDAY REvEVI, Feb. 21, 1970.
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This would be an undesirable extension of the Board's authority.
Congress clearly never intended it to have the power to review the
m
reasonableness of working conditions established by an employer.
Decisions under the Act have traditionally recognized the employer's
freedom to act arbitrarily, absent a compelling statutory policy to
the contrary. 22 3 By addressing employer as well as union
discrimination, the statute would also serve another purpose Congress
did not intend it to perform-the general remedying of all equal
employment violations.224
In the absence of alternative civil rights remedies, there might be
more reason for the Board to play a major role in employer
discrimination. Given the existence of Title VII, however, the problem
is one of striking a proper balance between the legitimate, independent
interests of the NLRA and the carefully designed procedures
Congress has provided for minority discrimination cases. Despite the
resultant overlap, the policies and interests of the NLRA justify a
major Board role in union discrimination and in cases where the
employer is interfering with actual minority concerted protests. There
are, on the other hand, no similar policies supporting an extension
of Board authority to cases of independent employer discrimination.
A proper analysis of the Act's policies indicates that the only
appropriate role for the Board in Packinghouse-type cases is to direct
complainants to other equal employment agencies which are
specifically designed to handle them.2
222. See note 193 supra.
223. Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965). See cases cited in note
184 supra regarding the employer's right to make entirely arbitrary discharges. The following
cases also speak about traditional employer freedoms in the operation of his business with
which the Act could not interfere absent a compelling need. United States v. United
Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357 (1958); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956);
Peyton Packing Co.. 49 N.L.R.B. 828 (1943), enforced 142 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 730 (1944).
224. See note II supraand accompanying text.
225. The General Counsel's suggested variation of the Packinghouse theory is even less
persuasive than the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals' argument. See note 5 supra. In his Quarterly
Report, the General Counsel indicated that he intended to prosecute a case where the employer
refused to bargain with the union about the elimination of discriminatory working conditions.
The General Counsel stated that the employer violated 8(a)(1) by demonstrating the union's
ineffectiveness to the employees, undermining their faith in working through the union.
However, this employee reaction is likely to occur whenever the employer rejects a union
demand. To say that the employer's causing such a reaction is an unfair labor practice would
be to require him to yield on all important union demands-a result that the Act clearly does
not contemplate.
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CONCLUSION

The NLRB has a significant equal employment potential.
Interpretation of the NLRA indicates that the Board has authority
to utilize its unfair labor practice procedures to combat union
discrimination. The constitutional and historical statutory interests
of the Act in this area justify a Board role in spite of the existence
of more explicit civil rights provisions. Six years of experience with
Title VII's weaknesses confirms this conclusion. Any dangers of
overlapping authority and duplicative efforts by the Board and other
agencies can clearly be avoided by the development of appropriate
liaison and rules of accommodation at the administrative level.281
The Board also has an important function in two types of
employer discrimination cases. The first occurs when the employer
supports and contributes to union discrimination. The second
category concerns situations where the employer takes punitive action
against minority employees because of their involvement in concerted
protests. In these areas, the NLRB offers the advantage of public
enforcement over other equal employment agencies. However, it also
has special limitations which do not exist in express civil rights
statutes. Thus, the Board does not have broad remedial power to
eliminate discriminatory conditions when an employer interferes with
a concerted minority protest-its authority is limited to an order
requiring a return to the status quo. Moreover, Packinghouse
notwithstanding, the Act does not support the conclusion that
independent discriminatory acts by employers or the general existence
of discriminatory working conditions in a company are unfair labor
practices.
To the extent that the Board does have a function in this area,
it is clear that its current potential is not being realized. A number
of reported minority discrimination cases closely followed the
Miranda decisionw but there have been relatively few such cases in
recent years. Evidently, the passage of Title VII and the emergence
of section 1981 cases have turned the attention of discrimination
victims away from the NLRA. The flood of cases, predicted and
feared by the critics of Miranda228 on the basis that it would
226. See notes 92-102 supraand accompanying text.

227. See cases cited in note 3 supra.
228. See NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172, 176 (2d Cir. 1963). In rejecting the
Board's Mirandatheory, the court said:
We pause to observe that against the background of the present nationwide interest
in discrimination for reasons of race, nationality, color or religion, and the natural
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overwhelm the Board's capacities, has never developed. The number
of cases has been too small to cause concern about the Board's ability
to handle them. Even the commentators appear to have lost some
of their early interest in the Board's potential. A raft of articles
appeared in the early and mid-1960's regarding the NLRB and racial
discrimination22 but there has been relatively little written in this area
in recent years. 2 1
The reason for the shortage of cases may lie in the law's
uncertainty. The Board itself split in Miranda,231 and its division has
continued in subsequent cases. 12 Only three circuits have resolved the
Miranda question, 33 and one has decided against the Board's
theory. 23 The Supreme Court has been reluctant to take a stand on
the issue. 23 Thus, the victim of discrimination who opts for NLRB
procedures is a pioneer in the majority of circuits, traveling on an
uncertain path without even knowing whether he has a legal right
under the Act until a circuit court of appeals reviews his case at the
end of his exploration. Despite uncertainties regarding its role, the
Board would appear to offer an attractive option to the victim of
discrimination who cannot or does not wish to bring a private action.
For such a person the Board's procedures should be a far more
desirable alternative than total abandonment of his claim.
It is interesting that the uncertainty has lasted so long. Miranda
tendency of human beings to attribute their lack of success to discrimination of one
kind or another against them, it seems inevitable that the Board would be inundated
with charges of this character, were we to sustain the ruling of the Board in this case.
229. Carter, The National Labor Relations Board and Racial Discrimination,2 LAW IN
TRIANSTION Q. 87 (1965); Herring, The FairRepresentationDoctrine: An Effective Weapon
Against Union Racial Discrimination?,24 MD. L. Rav. 113 (1964); Molinar, The National
Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination,7 B.C. IND. &CONINt. L. REV. 601 (1966);
Sherman, Union's Duty of FairRepresentation and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 49 MINN.
L. REV. 771 (1965); Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination,
62 COLUM. L. Rav. 563 (1962).

230. There has been only one comprehensive law review lead article devoted to this topic
in recent years-Boyce, Racial Discrimination and the National Labor Relations Act: A
Survey, 65 Nw. U.L. REv. 232 (1970). It is written by a Regional Attorney for the National
Labor Relations Board, and primarily surveys many of the cases in the area, suggesting a shift
in the burden of proof in race discrimination cases.
231. Only three of five Board members voted for the Miranda result. 140 N.L.R.B. 181
(1962).
232. A brief analysis of recent voting patterns by Board members on this issue is contained
in Boyce, supra note 230, at 257 n.84.
233. Truck Drivers Local 586 v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir. 1967); URW Local 568
v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir.
1963).
234. NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
235. See cases cited in note 30 supra.
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is now almost ten years old and the discussion of a possible role for
the Board in minority discrimination cases began long before
Miranda was decided.2 s The issue appears to be more than ripe for
resolution by the Supreme Court. The question is one of considerable
significance and the circuit courts of appeal are in conflict. The
Supreme Court may have felt safe in avoiding the issue thus far
because of the small number of cases in the area. If disillusion with
Title VII continues, however, it is highly possible that more unfair
labor practice complaints by discrimination victims will be filed
under the NLRA. If that happens, the Court may find it necessary
to clarify the Board's equal employment role within the next few
years. That decision should finally determine the full ramifications
of the Steele case. After almost thirty years of uncertainty and
controversy, it is awaited with great interest.
236. For early discussions regarding the Board's potential in duty of fair representation
cases, see Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. REV. 151, 172-75 (1957);
Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responibility in a Federal
System, 67 YAL L.J. 1327, 1357-61 (1958).

